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This thesis analysed prices and exchange rates of eleven EMU States using time 
series analysis. Among the criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty as requirements of 
participating in the euro zone, price stability and exchange rate convergence were 
examined. The answers for the questions such as whether or not the prices and 
exchange rates move together permanently, and the PPP hypothesis holds for euro 
against US dollar, Japanese yen and Turkish lira were investigated. For these 
purposes, real exchange rate indices for the euro zone were calculated using the data 
on prices and nominal exchange rates. The prices, bilateral nominal and real 
exchange rates of the EMU States were found to have a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among themselves. However, there was no evidence of PPP for euro 
against US dollar, Japanese yen and Turkish lira.
Keywords: EMU, prices, real exchange rate, nominal exchange rate, unit root, 
cointegration, PPP hypothesis.
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ÖZET
AVRUPA PARA BİRLİĞİNİN ÜÇÜNCÜ AŞAMASINA DOĞRU FİYATLARIN 
VE DÖVİZ KURLARININ ZAMAN SERİLERİ ANALİZİ
Oya Pınar Ardıç 
iktisat Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Faruk Selçuk
Temmuz 1998
Bu çalışmada, Avrupa Para Birliğine (APB) katılacak olan onbir ülkenin fiyat 
endeksleri ve döviz kurları incelendi. Maastricht Anlaşmasının APB’ye katılabilmek 
için ortaya koyduğu şartlardan fiyat istikrarı ve döviz kuru yakınlaşması üzerinde 
duruldu. Bu çalışma, fiyatların ve döviz kurlarının uzun vadede kalıcı olarak birlikte 
hareket etmelerini ve euro ile Amerikan doları, Japon yeni ve Türk lirası arasında 
Satmalma Gücü Paritesi (SGP) hipotezinin geçerliliğini araştırdı. Bu amaçla, fiyat 
ve nominal döviz kuru endeksleri kullanılarak APB’ye üye ülkeler için reel döviz 
kuru endeksleri hesaplandı. APB ülkeleri için fıyatlarrm ve döviz kurlarının uzun 
vadede kendi aralarında denge ilişkisinde bulunduğu saptandı. Ancak, euro ile 
Ameraikan doları, Japon yeni ve Türk lirası arasında SGP hipotezinin geçerliliği 
kanıtlanamadı.
Anahtar Kelimeler: APB, fiyatlar, reel döviz kuru, nominal döviz kuru, birim kök, 
eşbütünleşme, SGP hipotezi.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1999 European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will be 
reality and eleven European countries will adopt “euro” as their single currency. The 
origins of the idea of EMU go back to 1970s. The Delors Report of 1989 formed the 
basis for the Maa.stricht Treaty signed in early 1992. This treaty put forth the 
fundamentals of the economic integration and the convergence criteria to be 
followed in order to become a member of EMU (Taylor, 1997).
In March 1998, the European Commission presented the “Convergence 
Report” to the European Council and proposed the membership of eleven countries 
to the EMU (The European Commission, Convergence Report 1998). Accordingly, 
in May, the European Council decided that Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain would 
adopt the euro on January 1, 1999 whereas Greece is expected to join two years later, 
on 1 January 2001. By July 2002, the national currencies of all the participating 
countries would be fully replaced by euro.
In economics, the replacement of national currencies of several countries by a 
common currency is often analysed within the framework of “Optimum Currency 
Area” theory, which was due to the 1961 work of Mundell. In a currency area, the 
exchange rates of the participating currencies are fixed. The question is then: “what 
is the appropriate domain of the currency area?” (Mundell, 1961, p.657). Mundell 
defined the optimal zone for a single currency area as the zone within which labor is 
willing and able to move freely. McKinnon (1963) later replied to Mundell and 
argued that the optimal zone is determined by the degree of openness of the
economy. According to McKinnon, the word “optimum” is used to define a single 
currency area in which monetary and fiscal policies together with the external 
flexible exchange rates can be used to solve the three objectives in the best way: “/j 
the maintenance of full employment, ii) the maintanance of balanced international 
payments, and Hi) the maintenance of a stable internal average price level” 
(McKinnon, 1963, p. 717).
Copeland (1994, p.281) defines the monetary union as:
A single currency zone (or monetary union) is one where the expected 
means of payment consists of a single, homogeneous currency or of two 
or more currencies which are linked by an exchange rate which is fixed 
(at one-for-one) irrevocably.
Therefore, monetary union is more “fixed” than a fixed exchange rate regime 
because it involves one-for-one fixing and it is irrevocable. The major cost of a 
monetary union to its participants is the loss of the ability to conduct a national 
monetary policy.
EMU will require its participants to fix their exchange rates irrevocably by 
January 1, 1999. However, if there exist persistent differences in monetary policies 
of the participating countries, it will not be feasible to keep exchange rates fixed for 
a long time. Hence, EMU will also require a single monetary authority to conduct 
single monetary and exchange rate policies in euros (Taylor, 1997). This institution 
will be a union of the national central banks under the name European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB).
It is obvious that EMU will have significant political and economic 
consequences. The major problem and a question in many people’s minds is that 
whether Europe will be able to satisfy the criteria of an optimum currency
areadespite a lack of sufficient labour mobility, especially in the face of potential 
exchange rate shocks which have to be dealt with in the absence of exchange rate 
instrument (Overturf, 1997).
Apart from these concerns, it is widely agreed that euro will play an 
important role as a stabiliser in international monetary system along with the US 
dollar and Japanese yen because the economic indicators of the euro zone are 
comparable to those of the United States and Japan. The population of EMU was 290 
million in 1996, whereas United States has a population of 266 million and Japan 
126 million. Furthermore, in 1997, the GDP of euro zone was $6,304 billion, while 
the United States’ GDP is $7,819 billion and Japanese GDP is $4,223 billion. In 
addition, the euro zone has a significant share of world trade: in 1996, the exports of 
euro zone amounted to $2,067 billion, its imports were $1,859 billion, thus yielding 
a trade balance of $208 billion. Meanwhile, the United States had exports of $845 
billion and imports of $963 billion. In addition, Japanese exports were $457 billion 
and imports were $432 billion in 1996. As these numbers indicate, euro is likely to 
challenge US dollar and Japanese yen in international markets (Source: OECD).
There are various expectations from EMU. Some of the member countries 
expect more benefits than costs while others are suspicious about the future of EMU. 
It is obvious that among the many benefits of single currency for member countries, 
low inflation expectations and stable growth can be cited. However, more important 
than these, euro will eliminate exchange rate risk in terms of trade and investment in 
EMU. Moreover, larger internal market would increase productivity as well as 
competitiveness (Ozbay, 1997).
After EMU, there will be major changes in the world economic outlook 
regarding global trade, investment and international finance. One of the major 
consequences of these issues is real exchange rate determination. Real exchange rate 
is a key indicator of international competitiveness and economists have long been 
arguing about the fundamentals behind the fluctuations in real exchange rates. 
Therefore, determination of the real exchange rate for the new European currency is 
a crucial step in interpreting the competitiveness of the euro zone against the United 
States and Japan, the two countries that have major effects on the world economy.
The purpose of this study is to analyse the time series properties of prices and 
exchange rates of the euro zone. For this purpose, an empirical investigation is 
carried out. The results indicate that the price indices of the eleven EMU participants 
have a long-run equilibrium relationship. In addition, almost all nominal bilateral 
exchange rates and real bilateral exchange rates among these countries are found to 
be cointegrated for each country. Finally, the PPP hypothesis does not hold for 
neither of the euro/$, euro/yen or euro/TL real exchange rate indices.
In the next chapter, a brief history of the idea of the economic and monetary 
union is given along with the recent economic developments in Europe. The third 
chapter provides an overview of real exchange rates. Chapter four presents 
definitions of basic concepts used as the tools of the empirical analysis in the 
remainder of the study. In the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters, the nature of 
equilibrium relationships among the price levels, bilateral nominal and real exchange 
rates of the eleven EMU members are investigated. The eighth chapter tests 
purchasing power parity hypothesis for euro versus US dollar, Japanese yen and 
Turkish lira. The concluding remarks are given in the ninth chapter.
CHAPTER II: THE HISTORY OF EMU AND THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMY
This chapter presents a brief history of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and recent economic developments in Europe. More detailed 
historical discussions can be found in Overturf (1997), Taylor (1997), and Jovanovic 
(1997).
1. The History of EMU
European economic integration began as early as 1950 with the Schuman 
Plan. At first, the aim was to unite Europe’s coal and steel resources. The European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established by the 1951 Treaty of Paris with 
the participation of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg. A few years later, the Benelux countries proposed to the ECSC the 
integration of transport and energy in addition to eoal and steel. In this respeet, the 
Spaak Committee was established. The Spaak report, which was accepted by the six 
ECSC countries in 1956, proposed the creation of the common market. This led to 
the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community 
(EEC) with the same six countries that formed the ECSC. The main purpose of EEC 
was to rule out internal trade barriers, to levy a common external tariff on 
manufactured goods, and to establish a common agricultural policy.
In the 1960s, exchange rate policies were questioned and Europe began to 
discuss a single currency. In 1969, a plan of action for the economic and the 
monetary union was introduced at the Hague European summit. In 1970, the Werner
Report which proposed three stages for the economic and monetary union was 
prepared.
The fii'st step after the Werner Report was to establish an exchange rate 
system which limited exchange rate fluctuations among member countries to bands 
of ± 2.25 percent around a fixed rate. Besides the six members of the EEC, the UK, 
Ireland, Denmark, and Norway joined this exchange rate system and the system 
became to be known as the “snake.” However, the snake had difficulties and by 1977 
only Germany, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg 
survived in the system.
The EEC continued with its six initial members until the first enlargement on 
1 January 1973. The UK, Denmark and Ireland joined the EEC while Norway 
decided to stay out.
By the late 1970s, it was understood that the monetary union could not be 
achieved under the policies designated according to the Werner Report due to the 
1973 Oil Crisis and the lack of convergence in fiscal policies. Later, with the efforts 
of France and Germany, the European Monetary System (EMS) was created in 1979, 
which aimed to have a zone of monetary stability in Europe. This system merely 
relied on the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), an arrangement of currency 
stabilisation. The mechanism required the national currencies to float against each 
other in ± 2.25 percent bands around a central rate. The central rates of each 
currency against another were calculated by using the values of the currencies 
against ECU (European Currency Unit), which was created in the early 1970s. In 
1980s, ERM served as a mechanism for the countries with relatively weaker
currencies to converge to a stable monetary policy and lower inflation by using the 
strong German mark as an anchor.
In 1985, the “White Paper on Completing of the Single Market” was 
presented to the European Commission by Lord Cockfield. The paper described the 
methodology of the plan known as the “1992.” The proposal was to remove the trade 
barriers and the restrictions on the movement of people, capital and goods in the 
European Community so as to create a single market by the end of 1992. According 
to the White Paper, the success of the proposed “Single Europe Program” depended 
on the Single European Act. The Single European Act, which came into effect in 
1987, represented a unity of purpose among the European Community States. The 
White Paper, together with the Single European Act, aimed to remove the physical, 
technical and fiscal barriers to trade and to complete the single European market by 
the end of 1992 (Devinney and Hightower, 1991).
The desire for monetary union was not over in Europe. The 1989 Delors 
Report put forth a three-stage program for the economic and monetary union. First 
stage of this plan required creating a single financial area, and narrowing the bands 
in ERM so as to complete the internal market. Stage two consists of closer 
cooperation in economic policies, establishing a common central bank to coordinate 
monetary policies, and the transition to locked exchange rates, that is, narrowing the 
bands in ERM a bit further. In stage three, the common central bank will be turned 
into an independent European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which will conduct 
single monetary policy. In addition, the exchange rates will be locked permanently, 
and a single currency will be introduced. The difference of the Delors Report from 
the Werner Report is that the Delors Report recommended that the fiscal policies of
the participating countries should be in accordance with of the monetary policy 
conducted by the ESCB instead of requiring centralisation.
In July 1990, the first stage of the Delors Plan was started. The European 
Council agreed on the Treaty on European Union at Maastricht in December 1991. 
This treaty was based on the 1989 Delors Report and it put a deadline for the 
beginning of the third stage: 1 January 1999.
However, the ERM had problems in the beginning of this first stage. Due to 
the reunification of Germany, the weakening of the US dollar, and the various 
political and social developments delaying the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 
the EU states, countries with weaker currencies were forced to devalue or to leave 
the ERM in the late 1992 through mid 1993. As a consequence the bands were 
widened to ± 15 percent, even wider than the bands before Maastricht. This 
resolution proved to be successful, and the governments continued their efforts to 
satisfy the convergence criteria.
The European Monetary Institute (EMI), the predecessor of ESCB, was 
founded in 1994. This initiated the second stage of EMU. The convergence criteria 
required by the Maastricht Treaty had to be fulfilled during this second stage. The 
criteria included price stability; restrictions on fiscal positions, i.e. government net 
borrowing and government gross debt; exchange rate stability; and interest rate 
convergence.
The “Convergence Report” of the European Commission presented to the 
European Council in March 1998 proposed the membership of eleven countries to 
EMU:
The Commission, after examining, in its convergence report, the 
fulfilment by each Member State of the convergence criteria, considers
that a high degree of sustainable convergence has been achieved in 
Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland; because they are exercising 
their opt-outs, it is not necessary to assess whether Denmark and the 
United Kingdom fulfil the other necessary conditions for the adoption of 
a single currency. On the basis of its report and that of EMI the 
Commission is recommending to the Council that Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal and Finland fulfil the conditions for adopting a single currency 
(European Commission, Convergence Report 1998).
In May 1998, the European Council approved the membership of the eleven 
countries that were recommended by the Commission and the European Central 
Bank was established. On 31 December 1998, the conversion rates into euro will be 
fixed.
2. The European Economy
This section will provide an overview of the European economy. The 
emphasis will be on the labor market, prices and interest rates. The ERM crises of 
the early 1990s are also reviewed. Finally, some recent developments will be 
presented in this section.
2.1 Prices
The Maastricht Treaty requires price stability of the participating countries. 
The condition is that for a country to participate in the EMU, over the last year 
before the beginning of the third stage, its consumer price inflation should not be 
more than 1.5% above that of the three countries that have the least inflation rates. In 
this sense, the price levels of the eleven participating countries should be convergent.
Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 show the CPIs of the ten member states compared 
with the CPI of Germany, which is the major partner of EMU. In Figure 2.1, the
CPIs of the Benelux countries and Germany are plotted. It is observed that consumer 
prices in the Benelux countries from 1980 to 1997 go together with the consumer 
prices in Germany. Consumer prices in the Netherlands went in line with those in 
Germany during 1980-1990. In the early 1990s, the price indices of the Benelux 
countries move together. The CPIs of the Mediterranean countries depart from that 
of Germany especially during the period of 1980-1990. Among those countries, 
Portugal has the most departing consumer prices. Spanish and Italian consumer 
prices seem to have the same trend throughout the period.
Figure 2.1 - The CPIs of the Benelioc Countries and Germany for the period: 1980-1990
Especially after 1990, the consumer prices in Germany, Finland, Ireland, 
France and Austria exhibited similar patterns. Furthermore, Austrian CPI has always 
been almost the same as the German CPI.
Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 show the percentage changes in the consumer 
prices of these countries. These provide a clear picture of the convergence of 
inflation rates among the EMU states. In Figure 2.4, the percentage changes in the 
CPIs of Benelux countries are compared with those of Germany. The consumer price
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inflation in these countries have exhibited similar swings during 1980-1997 and they 
seem to stabilize around 2% in 1996 and 1997.
Figure 2.2 - The CPIs of the Meditarrenean Countries and Germany for the period: 1980-1997
Figure 2.3 - The CPIs of France, Germany, Finland, Ireland and Austria for the period: 1980-1997
Similarly, consumer price inflation in Italy and Spain had same cycles while 
Portugal experienced increasing inflation from 1980 to 1984 (see Figure 2.5). After 
1984, the Portuguese consumer price inflation started to decline and eventually 
converged to those of Italy and Spain. During the 1980s, the Mediterranean countries
11
had inflation rates above the German rate, however, after 1992, their inflation rates 
reached the German level.
Figure 2,4 - The Percentage Changes in the CPIs of the Benelux Countries and Germany for
the period: 1980-1997
Figure 2,5 - The Percentage Changes in the CPIs of the Mediterranean Countries and 
Germany for the period: 1980-1997
-Spain -Portugal Italy ■Germany
Figure 2.6 depicts the percentage changes in the CPIs of the remaining 
countries: France, Finland, Ireland, Austria and Germany. In the early 1980s, the 
change in the consumer prices in Ireland was high relative to the other four
12
countries. However, together with French and Finnish consumer price inflations, 
Irish inflation converged to the German level. Austrian consumer price inflation has 
always moved in line with German rate with some small deviations. It is observed 
that after 1994, the consumer price inflations in these five countries stabilised around
2%.
Figure 2.6 - The Percentage Changes in the CPIs o f France, Germany, Ireland, Finland, 
and Austria for the period: 1980-1997
Figure 2.7 - The Percentage Changes in the CPIs for the period: 1980-1997
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With Figure 2.7, we can compare the inflation levels of the eleven 
participating countries. Except Portugal, the remaining ten countries have 
experienced similar cycles in terms of consumer price inflation throughout the 
period. The Portuguese high inflation of the early 1980s declined in the second half 
of the 1980s and Portuguese consumer price inflation converge to those of the other 
European countries in the 1990s. It is also observed from Figure 2.7 that the inflation 
rates of these eleven countries stabilised around 2% in the last two or three years.
2.2 Interest Rates
The criterion set by the Maastricht Treaty about interest rate convergence 
puts a restriction on long-term government bonds. The requirement about long-term 
interest rates is that in the final year of stage two, they cannot be more than 2% 
points higher than the long-term interest rates of the three countries which have had 
the least inflation in terms of price stability as explained above.
Figure 2.8 - Long-term Interest Rates over the period: 1980-1997
-Portugal -Spain -Netherlands -x-Luxembourg -^ Ire la n d -Italy
-Germany -----France — Belgium -Austria -Finland
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Figure 2.8 summarises the behaviour of the long-term interest rates of the 
EMU members. As in the case for prices, the thi'ee Mediterranean countries had 
shown a different performance from the other eight countries. However, their rates 
started to decline after 1995 and converged to the long-term interest rates of the 
remaining countries. By 1997, the long-term interest rates of the participating states 
converged and started to fluctuate between 4.8% and 6.8%.
2.3 Labor Market
Labor markets and labor mobility have been a major issue when European 
economic and monetary union is discussed. This is because of the persistent high 
unemployment rates the European countries have been experiencing. This section 
provides an overview of the European labor markets and labor mobility in the 
European Union. Intra-EU labor mobility is low when compared to the non-EU 
migrants in the EU States. This might seem to be a major drawback in terms of a 
monetary union when the theory of optimum currency areas is considered. As it was 
noted before, Mundell (1961) suggested that the optimum zone of a currency area 
should be the one in which labor is able and willing to move freely.
In Europe, unemployment rates have been high and the European 
performance in creating new jobs has been poor (see Table 2.1 below). Since 1957, 
the European labor force has expanded due to increase in population and women 
looking for work. In addition, employment structure has changed, there has beem a 
shift of employment from agriculture to industry. All these factors, together with 
non-EC migrant labor led to increase in unemployment among the European
15
Community nationals, especially among the young and women which was long-term 
in nature (Collins, 1990).
By the 1957 Treaty of Rome, freedom of movement of labor among the EC 
countries was decided. However, it was not till 1968 that the work permits were 
abolished and preferences for domestic labor were no longer allowed. This slow 
progress was due to the fact that the domestic workers feared losing jobs to foreigner 
and governments feared that countries would export their unemployment. After the 
first oil crisis, the European Community economies have undergone a recession 
which gave rise to unemployment (Mayes, 1990).
Table 2.1 - Labor Force Statistics of EMU States
Labor Force Employment Unemployment 
1996 (1,000) 1996 (1,000) 1996 %
Austria 3,876 3,737 3.6
Belgium 4,297 3,695 12.9
Finland 2,531 2,087 16.1
France 25,613 21,951 12.3
Germany 39,294 35,360 9.0
Ireland 1,494 1,307 11.9
Italy 23,385 20,036 12.0
Luxembourg 218 212 3.3
Netherlands 7,516 6,983 6.5
Portugal 4,885 4,475 7.5
Spain 16,159 12,394 21.9
Total 129,268 112,237 13.2
Source: OECD
As it is seen at the table above, Spain had the highest rate of unemployment 
in 1996 while Luxembourg had the lowest. Many major European economies 
experienced two digit unemployment rates such as Belgium, France and Italy. The 
unemployed in the EMU zone was 13.2% of the total labor force in 1996.
In the 1980s, European unemployment increased substantially and exceeded 
the OECD average persistently. Furthermore, more than half of the unemployment 
was long-term in nature. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) concluded that this high
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unemployment in early 1980s is due to Europe’s diminished ability to cope with 
periods of economic turbulence.
In the late 1980s, unemployment problem gained priority in Europe. The 
underlying reasons of unemployment were considered to be the relatively inflexible 
labor markets of Europe. The labor markets have responded slowly to shocks and 
policy changes, and thus, the European efforts to create more jobs turned down 
(Dent, 1997).
The degree of labor market flexibility, that is, wage flexibility and labor 
mobility, in addition to facing symmetric demand and supply shocks is very 
important in determining whether a monetary union is attractive for potential 
candidates. The theory of optimum currency areas require for participating countries 
to have high labor market flexibility if they experience divergence in output and 
employment growth (De Grauwe, 1994).
Labor mobility was an issue which attracts attention of the EMU because as 
EEC was a common market and a customs union, restricting labor mobility could 
only prevent efficient resource allocation in Europe (Overturf, 1986). The 
development of trade patterns will be greatly affected by the degree of factor 
mobility. If labor mobility is restrained, then wage differential among countries will 
increase. Therefore, lower-wage countries will have competitive advantage against 
higher-wage countries for labor-intensive products (Mayes, 1990).
After the Second World War, four phases of labor mobility were observed in 
Europe. The first one, through 1945-1960, consisted of movements due to the 
adjustment to the new circumstances after war. The second phase was initiated by 
labor shortages and lasted from 1955 to 1973. This mainly consisted of the
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movement of non-EC labor to EC countries, especially France and Germany. The 
third phase was through 1973-1988 and it involved a restrained migration because of 
the recessions after the first oil-price crisis. European countries encouraged foreign 
workers to return home and recruitment of foreign labor was stopped. However, 
these did not work and the family member of non-EC workers joined them to work 
in the EC. The fourth phase started after the dissolution of socialism. As a result of 
economic transition and ethnic wars, people moved to EU from Eastern European 
countries. In addition to these developments, it is observed that the internal labor 
mobility in the European Union declined over the period from the 1960s to the late 
1980s (Jovanovic, 1997).
The EU countries took measures to enhance internal labor mobility in EU. 
These include elimination of limits on migration, job information sharing, and social 
security benefits transfer. These rights of EU workers were quite different from those 
of non-EU workers. These measures were expected to cause the movement of labor 
from low to high-wage countries, and thus a decrease in the wage differential. This 
decrease in the wage differential would lead to a subsequent decline in migration. 
Actually, these expectations proved to be true. Labor moved especially from Italy to 
the North to France and West Germany, wage differential declined, and as a result, 
migration declined (Overturf, 1986).
In 1993, the European Commission has put forth strategies for employment 
growth which were based on the “White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and 
Employment.” These required the coordination of policies to create new jobs in 
Europe. The target was to reduce the unemployment rate in the EU to 5% by creating 
15 million jobs by the year 2000. This required an annual employment growth rate of
18
2% in through 1995-2000. However, only Austria and Luxembourg had 
unemployment rates below this requirement among the EMU States in 1996 (see 
Table 2.1). Moreover, six of the eleven EMU members have unemployment levels of 
more than 10%. European countries need to improve both the employer’s and the 
employee’s ability to create jobs. In addition, education and training should be more 
emphasised (Dent, 1997).
2.4 EMS in the Early 1990s
On December 10, 1991, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union was 
agreed by the heads of the governments of the European Union States. The main 
point of the Treaty was that it announced a single monetary zone for Europe. To 
achieve that single monetary zone, some degree of economic convergence must be 
established, and the criteria of this convergence were also set by the Maastricht 
Treaty. Among the countries which signed the Treaty, Denmark and Ireland had to 
hold referanda due to constitutional requirements.
The Danish government decided to hold the referandum on 2 June 1992. 
However, because of the fears of losing national identity and control over the Danish 
krone, and having no confidence in political leadership, Danes voted “No” for the 
Maastricht Treaty. This was a shock which led to arising doubts about EMU and 
troubles in the ERM (Overturf 1997, Pitchford et. al. 1997).
After the Danish rejection, French president decided to hold a referandum in 
September. After the Irish voted in favor of the Treaty in June, French did so in 
September.
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In the meantime, there were troubles in the ERM. Portuguese escudo entered 
the mechanism in April 1992. The crises in the ERM started in September 1992 with 
the collapse of the Finnish markka under speculative selling. In fact, Finland was not 
a member of either of the ERM or the EMS or even the European Union at that time, 
but was voluntarily peggingthe markka to the ERM. At the same time, Sweden 
raised interest rates as a result of a similar event although it was not in the system. 
The Swedish government was able to maintain its peg with that increase in interest 
rates. However,Sweden finally had to abandon pegging in November, after further 
troubles in the ERM.
On September 13‘**, Italian government devalued the liraand Germany 
reduced interest rates as a result of an agreement. The realignment of lira was 7%, 
which was below what was thought to be necessary to correct the inflation 
differential of several years and the subsequent exchange rate misalignment.
These developments led to a big crisis in the ERM on 16 September 1992, 
known as the “Black Wednesday.” British pound, Italian lira and Spanish peseta 
came under speculative attacks and were forced below the floors of ERM bands 
because they were considered overvalued. Both British pound and Italian lira 
dropped out from the ERM. Spanish peseta could stay in with a 5% devaluation. 
Ireland, Spain, and Portugal imposed exchange controls temporarily (Overturf 1997, 
Pitchford et. al. 1997).
After the drop out by Swedish krona in November, Portugal and Spain 
devalued their currencies by 6%. Denmark, France and Ireland were next to come. 
By Bundesbank support, French franc survived.
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On 1 January 1993, the single European market started and exchange rate 
controls in Ireland, Spain and Portugal were removed. Then, Ireland raised interest 
rates and devalued by 10%. In the meantime, Danish Central Bank intervened to 
maintain the krone’s peg to the ERM.
In July 1993, there was a huge selling of the French franc against German 
mark. This time Bundesbank intervention was not enough to save the franc from 
falling below the floor of ERM bands. After an emergency meeting, finance 
ministers and central bankers decided to widen the bands of the ERM to ±15 % 
except for the German mark - Dutch guilder bands which remained as ±2.25 %.
As a result of the crises in the ERM, bands were widened. Wider bands 
helped the continuation of official participation in the EMS, let the countries show 
the credibility of their commitment and allowed for an easier transition by leaving 
room for a realignment towards the third stage. Finally, there was more uncertainly 
in the speculative process because of wider bands, and stability was restored in the 
markets (Overturf, 1997).
In the meantime, the Danes were given another chance to vote. The second 
referandum was held in May 1993. This time, they voted for the Maastricht Treaty. 
The second stage of EMU started on 1 January 1994 after the ratification of the 
Treaty by the German Constitutional Court in November 1993 which was the last to 
raitfy among the European Union States.
In the first stage, Europe faced many developments which resulted in 
stepping back fron the EMU by European citizens, these include the breakup of 
Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, the increased nationalistic feelings in 
Europe, the rapid shift of former Soviet States towards capitalistic economies, the
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distrust in politics and politicians, the war in Bosnia, economic uncertainity and 
unemployment.
2.5 The Recent Developments
The European Commission announced the method for determining the 
irrevocable conversion rates for the euro on 2 May 1998 (European Union, 1998). 
According to the announced method, the ERM bilateral central rates of the 
participating currencies as of May 1998 will be used to calculate the conversion 
rates. It will be the responsibility of the central banks of the member countries to 
ensure that the market exchange rates on 31 December 1998 will satisfy the central 
ERM rates of May 1998 (see Table 2.1). On 1 January 1999, the irrevocable 
conversion rates will be adopted as the third stage begins.
In addition to these developments, ECU will be replaced by euro one-for-one 
on 1 January 1999 in every legal instrument involving euro. This requires the 
conversion rates for euro be equal to the official value of ECU as of 31 December 
1998.
One difficulty arises in this context: ECU includes British pound, Danish 
krone, and Greek drachma. Therefore, it is possible to fix bilateral rates of the 
currencies of the eleven EMU countries before the end of 1998, but it is not possible 
to announce the irrevocable rates at which the participating currencies will be 
converted into euro. Therefore, 1 January 1999 can be taken as the beginning of 
EMU. In addition to these initial countries, Greece is expected to join the euro zone 
two years later, on 1 January 2001. Euro notes and coins will be introduced on 1 
January 2002, three years after the beginning of the third stage. Only six months
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after, national notes and coins will be abandoned and euro will be the only legal 
tender in the EMU states.
Table 2 .2  - ERM Bilateral Central Rates to be Used in Determining the 
Irrevocable Conversion Rates for the Euro.
DEM
100=
BF7 LF 
100=
E SP
100=
FRF
100=
lE P  
1 =
IT L
1000=
NLG
100=
ATS
100=
PTE
100=
FIM
100=
DRM -
B F/L F 2062.55
ESP 8507.22 412 .462
FRF 335.386 16.26 3.94
IFP 40.27 1.95 0.47 12.01
ITL 99000 .2 4799 .90 1163.72 29518.3 2458.56
NLG 112.67 5.46 1.32 33.60 2.80 1.14
ATS 703.55 34.11 8.27 209.77 17.47 7.11 624 .42
PTE 10250.5 496 .98 120.49 3056.34 254 .56 103.54 9097.53 1456.97
FIM 304.00 14.74 3.57 90.64 7.55 3.07 269.81 43.21 2.97 -
Source: The European Commission (The numbers are rounded up to two
decimal places).
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CHAPTER III: REAL EXCHANGE RATES: AN OVERVIEW
Among the various theories of real exchange rate determination, the 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) approach is the most common. Zietz (1996) defines 
the PPP form of real exchange rate as the nominal exchange rate multiplied by a 
ratio of a domestic price index to a foreign price index. The basic assumption of the 
PPP approach is that equilibrium real exchange rates remain constant over time, and 
thus, relative price differences between countries are offset by the movements in 
nominal exchange rates.
There are three versions of this approach. The first one is called the “Law of 
One Price” and it says that the real exchange rate can be calculated by assuming that 
the price of a good denominated in home currency is equal to the price of the same 
good denominated in foreign currency. To illustrate, let the price of “A” be 
TL750,000 in Turkey and $3 in the US. Then, according to the law of one price, the 
real exchange rate is 250,000 TL/$. But, the shortcoming of this approach is that, in 
order to make such a comparison between prices in terms of different currencies, the 
good in question should be identical in both countries. The law of one price also 
assumes no transaction costs and no trade barriers, which are not very realistic (Clark 
et.al., 1994).
Second version of the PPP approach is the Absolute PPP hypothesis. Under 
the same assumptions as the law of one price (no transaction costs, no trade barriers 
and homogeneity of goods across two countries), absolute PPP defines the real 
exchange rate by the help of the condition that the price of one basket of goods and 
services denominated in domestic currency is equal to the price of that identical 
basket denominated in foreign currency (Clark, et. al., 1994).
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Relative PPP hypothesis is the third version of the PPP theory. The basic 
assumption is that the percentage changes in the nominal bilateral exchange rate are 
equal to the differences between the inflation rates of two countries. The relative PPP 
hypothesis states that one country’s inflation rate can only be higher than another’s 
to the extent that its exchange rate depreciates (Copeland, 1994).
Some other major theories of the real exchange rate determination are the 
Balance of Payments Approach, the Macroeconomic Balance Approach, the Relative 
Price of Tradables and Non-tradables, the Monetary Approach and the Asset Market 
View.
While there are large deviations from purchasing power parity in the short- 
run, there is evidence that the real exchange rates eventually converge to PPP in the 
long-run. Edwards (1988) defines the sustained deviation of the short-run real 
exchange rate from its long-run equilibrium level (PPP) as the “real exchange rate 
misalignment.”
The large deviations from PPP can be attributable to three main factors: i) 
changes in the terms of trade (TOT) because of changes in trade patterns, ii) changes 
in the relative price of home and traded goods because of economic growth, and Hi) 
deviations in real price ratios because of monetary and exchange rate changes, 
imperfectly fixed wages and prices (Dornbusch, 1988). This issue is crucial in the 
sense that small deviations from PPP can cause large changes in trade flows which in 
turn induce external competitiveness. In addition to these effects, real depreciation 
increases inflation while real appreciation reduces.
To clarify the issue, we can adopt Dornbusch’s (1988) definition of the real 
exchange rate:
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r = - ^
e.p,
(3.1)
where r is the real exchange rate, pd and pf denote the domestic and foreign price 
levels respectively, and the nominal bilateral exchange rate between the two 
countries in question is denoted by e. According to this definition, an increase in r 
indicates a real appreciation whereas a decrease in r indicates a real depreciation.
Dornbusch (1976) developed a model about exchange rate determination 
which emphasises sticky prices in product and labor markets. The importance of the 
model is the assumption that product markets adjust slowly but financial markets 
adjust instantaneously. This means that financial markets should over-adjust in 
response to shocks in order to compensate the stickiness of the prices in the goods 
markets. For example, when nominal money stock increases, real money stock will 
increase as a consequence since prices are sticky. In order for money market to clear, 
domestic nominal interest rate should decrease, so that the demand for real balances 
is equal to the supply of real balances. The decrease in domestic interest rate would 
cause a real depreciation in the short-run. But this decrease in interest rate below 
world levels can only be temporary, because when prices increase later as a result of 
increased aggregate demand, the real money stock will decrease back to its original 
level. Therefore, interest rates will increase, demand for real balances will decrease 
and aggregate demand will decrease. The real exchange rate will be back at its 
original level while the nominal exchange rate will be at a new level (it will 
appreciate here).
When a real disturbance occurs, the overshooting phenomenon can be seen as 
a result of the over-adjustment of the real exchange rate, which has damaging
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consequences for the economy. In Dornbusch’s model, the exchange rate is in 
equilibrium only in the long-run, because in the short-run, sticky prices make 
exchange rate deviate from its equilibrium level. Dornbusch argues that when the 
exchange rate is above its long-run equilibrium level (overvalued), it will be 
expected that it will depreciate in the future rather than appreciate.
If a country’s real exchange rate is overvalued, this will be followed by an 
undervaluation. After the initial overvaluation, the international competitiveness of 
the country would worsen; thus, capital would be reallocated from tradables sector to 
non-tradables sector. Price of non-tradables would decrease because the cost of 
producing them had decreased. Therefore, there should be a depreciation before the 
real exchange rate converges to its long-run equilibrium level.
Therefore, real exchange rate provides an index of competitiveness and is 
crucial in a customs union. For example, a large real appreciation of the currency of 
a country engaged in a custom’s union will cause a large decline in the 
competitiveness of a country. This will induce the government to levy tariffs or to 
put non-tariff barriers. However, the main aim of a custom’s union is to remove 
internal tariff and non-tariff barriers. Thus, a custom’s union requires real exchange 
rate stability among its members (Artis, 1990).
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CHAPTER IV: UNIT ROOTS, INTEGRATION AND 
COINTEGRATION: BASIC DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
Most macroeconomic variables have stochastic and deterministic trends. The 
stochastic components are modelled as integrated processes. While the stochastic 
trends of real variables can be remedied by 1(7) models, those of nominal variables 
usually require 1(2) modelling, they are not stationary even after first differencing 
(Jorgensen, Kongsted, and Rahbek, 1996). In addition, the existence of a stationary 
combination of non-stationary variables is required by equilibrium theories involving 
them.
A stationary series exhibits mean reversion, that is, it will converge to its 
unconditional mean. In addition, it has a finite, time-invariant variance and a 
correlogram that dies out as the lag lengti increases (Enders, 1995).
The correlogram of a unit root process will diminish very slowly, its variance 
is time-dependent and becomes infinite as time goes to infinity. A unit root process 
does not have a value to which it will converge in the long-run (Enders, 1995).
This issue is very important since almost all macroeconomic variables have 
non-stationary components. The major tests for the presence of a unit root are 
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. Either differencing or detrending is used to 
make a non-stationary series stationary.
Engle and Granger (1987, p. 252) define integration as;
A series with no deterministic component which has a stationary, 
invertible, ARMA representation after differencing d times, is said to be 
integrated of order d, denoted x, ~ 1(d).
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The sum of an 1(0) series and an 1(7) series is 1(7). In addition, if Zt ~ l{d) 
then a + bz, is also I(ii), where a and b are constants, Similarly, when Zt and y,
are both integrated of order d, a linear combination of these two, say x,, is again l{d) 
in general. However, there are special cases that x, ~ l(d-b) where b is a positive 
integer.
This yields the definition of cointegration: the 1(d) process x, is called 
cointegrated of order d, b [Cl(d,b)] if P’xt is l(d-b) where P is called the cointegrating 
vector, yfttO; b=\,...,d\d=\.,... (Johansen, 1995).
The interpretation is as follows: assume d=b=\. This means that x, is 1(7) but 
P’xt (the equilibrium error) is 1(0). Therefore, equilibrium would occur, f i ’x, would 
wander around its mean. However, if Xi is not cointegrated, we cannot talk about an 
equilibrium relationship and P’xi would rarely be around its mean.
There can be more than one cointegrating vector. In fact, the number of 
linearly independent cointegrating vectors is equal to r, the rank of (pxr) matrix, 
where p is the number of components in x,. r is called the “cointegrating rank” of x, 
(Engle and Granger, 1987).
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CHAPTER V: DO PRICES MOVE TOGETHER IN THE LONG- 
RUN?
This chapter concentrates on determining whether there exists a long-run 
relationship among the prices of eleven EMU countries. For this purpose, 
cointegration analysis of the price indices of the eleven countries is used.
Table 5.1 - Inflation rates of participating states..
1997 Inflation (%) 1998 Inflation (%)
Austria 1.1 1.5
B elgium 1.4 1.3
Finland 1.3 2 .0
France 1.2 1.0
Germany 1.4 1.7
Ireland 1.2 3.3
Italy 1.8 2.1
Luxem bourg 1.4 1.6
Netherlands 1.8 2.3
Portugal 1.8 2 .2
Spain 1.8 2 .2
M A A ST R IC H T  CRITERIA 3 .2 3 .2
Source: The Economist
For a monetary union to be successful, the economies of the member 
countries should be similar in structure and should exhibit resembling cycles in 
addition to having factor mobility and similar transmission mechanisms of the single 
monetary policy conducted by the single monetary authority. Although the recent 
inflation rates of the member states appear to be under the level set by the Maastricht 
Treaty (see Table 5.1), this does not assure that the resulting relationship among 
prices are permanent. However, we can adopt cointegration analysis which allows
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In the next section, the statistical model used in the analysis will be 
explained. The empirical model for eleven price indices and the estimation results 
will be provided in the subsequent sections.
1. The Statistical Model:
The p-dimensional autoregressive process x, is defined as:
X, = n , · + -t-OD,+f, i=l,...,T (5.1)
for fixed x.k+i,...,xo with f, being independent and identically distributed (iid) as 
Np(0,i2). D, is a term that includes any non-stochastic regressors such as seasonal or 
intervention dummies, constant or linear term. /7/ and 0  are the coefficients 
(Johansen, 1995).
The model reformulated as error correction form where x, is an 1(7) process 
can be written as:
Ax, = r, · Ax,_^  + ,.. -h · Ax,_^ _^  + n  · x,_, + jU + 0  ■ +£, (5.2)
f=l,...,T
The cointegration hypothesis is:
H ,(r ) :U = a fi ' (5.3)
where a  and ¡5 are pxr matrices. This is the hypothesis of at most r cointegrating 
vectors where r is the rank of /7 (Hansen and Juselius, 1995; Johansen, 1995).
The 1(2) model for /^-dimensional VAR is given by:
' The current econom etric practice allow s to estim ate only the linear long-run equilibrium  
relationships (Enders, 1995).
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where e, is iid Normal. A simpler notation for (5.4) is;
A^ jr, Ax,_,+4 z^, +£, t=u...,T (5.5)
where z ' = (¿S.^x'A^x'_¡^_^2 >k>') (Johansen, 1995).
In 1(2) models, there are two reduced rank conditions:
i. n  = a - P ' where a  and P are pxr matrices, r<p.
/
ii. r ■ ^  -7j' where ^ and p are (p-r)xs, s<p-r
Further details and statistical derivations are beyond the scope of this study 
and will be omitted. Johansen (1991 and 1995), and Hansen and Juselius (1995) give 
detailed discussions on 1(7) models while Johansen (1995), Paruolo (1996), 
Jorgensen, Kongsted and Rahbek (1996), and Juselius (1997) analyse 1(2) models.
2. The Tests for Determining the Cointegrating Rank
The tests used to determine the cointegrating rank depend on the significance 
of the characteristic roots of 77 The rank of a matrix is defined as the number of its 
characteristic roots that are different from zero. If all the roots are zero, then and 
the process is not cointegrated. For a /^-dimensional process 77 is a pxp matrix, and 
therefore has p characteristic roots.
The Xnux and Áinice test statistics are used to determine the cointegrating rank. 
As a first step, the p characteristic roots of the 77 matrix are ordered such that 
À/>À2>...>Âf,. Note that, for stability, the necessary and sufficient condition is that all
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largest root will be 0<Xi<\ and all the other roots will be zero.
Secondly, using the estimated /7 matrix and its characteristic roots, two test 
statistics are calculated:
К .,.(г )  = -Т ± 1 п (1 -Х ,)t
i=r+1
Я ^ ,(г ,г  + 1) = -Т1п(1-Л ,.,,)
(5.6)
(5.7)
where T is the number of observations and A. are the eigenvalues of FI. The critical 
values of A,,u,x i^nd Atnwe were calculated by Johansen and Juselius (1990).
The trace test is used to test the null of rank(77)<r while A,„ax is used to test 
the null of rank(/7)=r against the alternative of rank(/7)=r+i.
3. The Empirical Model
The data vector x, in this analysis consists of the natural logarithms of the 
price indices of the eleven countries with base year 1990 for the period 1980:1- 
1997:12 where:^
p/: CPI of Austria 
P2 : CPI of Belgium 
ps: CPI of Finland 
pp CPI of France 
p^: CPI of Germany
S ee A ppendix A  for details.
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ps: CPI of Luxembourg
P9 · CPI of the Netherlands
Pi o'. CPI of Portugal
pi¡: CPI of Spain
The price series are close to 1(7) and therefore, an 1(7) model is adopted for 
the analysis. All estimates are based on the two step procedure of Johansen (1995).
The calculations are made using the computer package CATS for RATS (Hansen 
and Juselius, 1995).
3.1 Estimation Results
The estimates of A,„ax and Xtrace statistics are provided in table 5.2. According 
to these results, the calculated X,„ax statistics allow to reject the null hypotheses of 
r=0 against the alternative of r=l; r=l against the alternative of r=2; r=2 against the 
alternative of r=3; and so on until the null of r=9 is rejected against r=10. However, 
it is not possible to reject Ho: r=10 against the alternative of /^11 at any 
conventional significance level.
Furthermore, Xtmee statistics calculated indicate similar results. The null 
hypothesis of r=10 against the general alternative cannot be rejected at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels of significance. These results lead us to determine the cointegrating rank 
as 10, that is, there exist 10 distinct cointegrating vectors.
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r=0 192.85 8 7 8 .4 0
л=1 163.16 685 .55
r=2 131.96 5 22 .39
r=3 100.91 390 .43
r=4 86.03 2 89 .52
r=5 64 .53 203 .49
r=6 4 8 .2 7 138.96
r=l 4 2 .3 7 90 .70
/^ 8 2 8 .8 0 4 8 .33
r=9 18.67 19.53
r=\0 0 .86 0 .8 6
3.2 Can any of the prices be excluded?
The analysis of whether any of the price indices can be excluded from the 
long-run analysis is given by:
(5.8)
The test statistic is asymptotically distributed as with r degrees of freedom 
(Hansen and Juselius, 1995). For r=10, the critical value is 15.98, 18.31 and 23.21 
at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. The results indicate that it is 
not possible to exclude any of the price indices from the lung-run analysis (see Table 
5.3).
Table 5.3 - statistics calculated for the eleven 
price indices for the test of long-run exclusion
Prices r
Inpj 101.19
lnp2 168.35
Inps 103.20
lnp4 119.82
Inps 2 10 .86
lnp6 118.52
lnp7 153.07
Inps 162.92
Inpn 104.00
Inpıo 112.00
Inpil 170.05
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The empirical results oi this chapter indicate that7tfee^29î№l§9Wipföii(2İj[^9g7  ^
run equilibrium relationship among the prices of the eleven countries participating in 
the EMU.
The data was found to be 1(7) prior to the analysis, and thus the model is 
adopted accordingly. Based on the sample period of 1980:1-1997:12, we can 
conclude that there exists a cointegrating relationship among the prices. In addition,
Xmax and Xtrace tcsts indicated the presence of 10 distinct cointegrating vectors. 
Moreover, it is found that none of the price indices can be excluded from this long- 
run relationship.
Therefore, it is possible to say that the prices of the eleven EMU participants 
move together in the long-run. This implies that the price indices are convergent as 
required by the Maastricht Treaty.
36
Ankara Şubesi: Ciunah Caddesi 3, Kavaklıdere, 06680
Tel: (M2) 427 81 45 Fax: (M2) 426 72 30
Ticaret Sicili: 82821¡26108 Sermayesi 6.000MO MO.-TL.
CHAPTER VI: AN ANALYSIS OF
7 iirk nm iteaŞırketı
Biiyiikdere Caddesi, Levent, 80613 İstanbul
RATES FOR ELEVEN EMU COUNTRIES 27s o4 37
Since 1979, there exists an arrangement of curreney stabilisation among 
European countries known as the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The purpose of 
ERM is to keep participating currencies trading without large fluctuations. 
Therefore, most of the European currencies are not allowed to fluctuate freely 
against each other. In addition, Belgium and Luxembourg already have a monetary 
union; their curreneies are fixed one-for-one.
The Maastricht Treaty required exchange rate stability as a criterion to 
participate in the EMU. According to this criterion, the currencies of the potential 
EMU countries must participate in the ERM at least two years before the beginning 
of the third stage. This requirement is to prevent the candidates devalue at their own 
initiative to gain eompetitiveness in the expense of others.
Thus, it is expected that the bilateral nominal exchange rates of the eleven 
participating countries move together in the long-run. This chapter adopts the 
cointegration analysis similar to the one used in the previous chapter for each of the 
EMU members to test whether its bilateral nominal exchange rates with the 
remaining nine countries have a long-run equilibrium relationship.
Since B elgium  and Luxem bourg have a m onetary union, they are counted as a single country here.
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1. The Statistical Model and the Tests for DeternliMih|'''11fi! '^‘e6î/i№^âlMf
Türk Rnıited Şirketi
Rank:
As expressed above, the statistical model used in this chapter is the same as 
the model described in section 5.1, equation 5.1 as the definition of the VAR model; 
equations 5.2 and 5.3 as the 1(7) model; and equations 5.4 and 5.5 as the 1(2) model. 
Similarly, the tests explained in section 5.2, X,nax and A,race, will be adopted in this 
chapter.
2. Estimation Results:
For each of the ten countries, the bilateral nominal exchange rates'  ^ are 
analysed. The results are summarised below. The data vector consists of the bilateral 
nominal exchange rates of Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain against each other.
2.1 Austria
Depending on the results of prior tests, a model with intercept and trend in 
the cointegrating relations is adopted.
According to the estimated output, the calculated A,„ax and A,,ace statistics 
indicate that the cointegrating rank r is 8 (see Table 6.1). We can reject the null 
hypotheses of r=0 against the alternative of r=l; r=\ against the alternative of r=2; 
till the null of r=l is rejected against r=8 by examining the Á,„ax statistics. It is not 
possible to reject Hq: r=% against the alternative of r=9 at any conventional 
significance level.
S ee A ppendix A  for details.
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In addition, Amwe statistics calculated indicate similar results. The null 
hypothesis of r=8 against r^S cannot be rejected at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance. Therefore, we can conclude that there are 8 distinct cointegrating 
vectors.
Table 6.1 - The test statistics calculated for  
respective values o f r under the null hypothesis for 
the Austrian data
n^a.x r^ace
r=0 166.30 600 .76
r=\ 146.15 4 3 4 .4 6
r=2 84 .12 288.31
r^3 57 .63 204 .19
r=4 4 9 .2 9 146.56
r=5 43 .23 97 .26
n=6 2 6 .72 54 .03
r=n 17.89 27.31
r=8 9 .42 9 .42
The results for the test of long-run exelusion (see equation 5.8) indicate that it
is not possible to exclude any of the variables from the long-run analysis. The critical
values with 8 degrees of freedom are 20.09 for 1%, 15.51 for 5%, and 13.36 for
10% levels of significance. The calculated ^  values are given in Table 6.2 below.
Table 6.2 - statistics calculated for the nine 
nominal exchange rate indices of Austria for the 
test of long-run exclusion
Exch. Rates ?
A us. Sch illing/B el.& L ux. Franc 111.37
A us. Schilling/F in . Markka 4 8 .0 4
A us. Schilling/Fra. Franc 106.74
A us. Schilling/G er. Mark 79 .77
A us. Schilling/Ire. Pound 87 .99
A us. Schilling/Ita. Lira 58 .38
A us. Sch illing/N et. Guilder 98 .67
A us. Schilling/Por. E scudo 53 .96
A us. Sch illing/Spa. Peseta 48
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that nine nominal bilateral exchange 
rates for Austria has a linear equilibrium relationship in the long-run and it is not 
possible to exclude any of them from the analysis.
39
2.2 Belgium and Luxembourg
Similar results are found for Belgium and Luxembourg. Both A,„ax and Armce 
tests indicate that the cointegrating rank is 8. Moreover, it is not possible to exclude 
any of the exchange rate indices from the long-run relationship. These results are 
summarised in tables 6.3 and 6.4.
Table 6.3- The test statistics calculated for  
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for 
the Belgium-Luxembourg data
n^a.x r^ace
r=0 123.83 4 4 5 .3 9
r=\ 8 5 .66 3 21 .86
r=2 72 .14 2 3 6 .2 0
r=3 56 .16 164 .06
r=4 4 0 .4 8 107.09
r=5 36 .28 6 7 .4 2
r=6 19.78 31 .14
r=7 10.78 11.35
r=8 0 .58 0 .58
According to the tests done prior to the analysis, an I(i) model without any
deterministic components is adopted for Belgium-Luxembourg.
Table 6.4 - y f statistics calculated for the nine 
nominal exchange rate indices of Belgium- 
Luxembourg for the test of long-run exclusion
Exch. Rates
Bel.i&Lux. Franc/Aus. Sch illing
..... ..........
54 .87
B el.& L ux. Franc/Fin. Markka 4 0 .3 9
B el.& L ux. Franc/Fra. Franc 82 .57
Bel.i&Lux. Franc/Ger. Mark 4 5 .2 8
B el.& L ux. Franc/Ire. Pound 57 .39
B el.& L ux. Franc/Ita. Lira 37 .02
B el.& L ux. Franc/Net. Guilder 89 .84
B el.& L ux. Franc/Por. Escudo 59 .99
B el.& L ux. Franc/Spa. Peseta 46
The critical values with 8 degrees of freedom are 20.09 for 1%, 15.51 for 
5%, and 13.36 for 10% levels of significance.
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2.3 Finland
Prior testing indicates a model similar to the one adopted for Austria in
section 2.1; an 1(7) model which includes a constant and a trend term in the
cointegrating relationships.
Table 6.5- The test statistics calculated for 
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for 
the Finnish data
n^a.x r^ace
r=0 140.45 5 22 .12
l - \ 135.17 4 1 1 .6 6
r=2 68.95 276 .49
r=2, 6 0 .04 2 07 .54
r=A 48 .27 147.50
r=5 41 .45 99 .22
r=6 31 .84 57 .77
r=l 16.98 25 .93
r=^ 8.95 8 .95
Table 6.5 above presents the estimation results for the nominal bilateral
exchange rates of Finland. These results lead us to determine the rank of the 77
matrix as 8 by using the Á,„ax and Átrace tests.
Table 6.6- statistics calculated for the nine 
nominal exchange rate indices of Finland for the 
test of long-run exclusion
Exch. Rates ?
Fin. M arkka/A us. Sch illing 51 .17
Fin. M arkka/Bel.& Lux. Franc 88 .13
Fin. Markka/Fra. Franc 77 .03
Fin. Markka/Ger. Mark 38.21
Fin. Markka/Ire. Pound 66 .15
Fin. Markka/Ita. Lira 4 1 .5 8
Fin. M arkka/Net. Guilder 72 .37
Fin. Markka/Por. E scudo 6 6 .7 0
Fin. M arkka/Spa. Peseta 5 2 .0 0
For the long-run exclusion, we can conclude at all conventional levels of 
significance that all the nine series should be included in the analysis of long-run 
relations. The statistics calculated are tabulated in Table 6.6 above. Again the
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statistics have 8 degrees of freedom and the critical values are 20.09 for 1%, 15.51 
for 5%, and 13.36 for 10% levels of significance.
2.4 France
Table 6.7 below presents the A,„ax and Átmce test statistics calculated for nine
nominal bilateral exchange rate indices for French franc in an 1(7) model which
includes no deterministic components.
Table 6.7 - The test statistics calculated for  
respective values o f r under the null hypothesis for 
the French data
H„ ^mi.x ^nice
r=0 131.82 4 40 .83
r=\ 92 .16 309 .02
r=2 69 .63 2 16 .86
r=3 50.01 147.22
r=4 37 .54 97.21
r=5 30 .85 59 .67
r=6 17.71 28 .82
r=l 10.97 11.11
r=8 0 .1 4 0 .14
According to the reported values in Table 6.7, it is possible to conclude that
there exist 8 distinct cointegrating vectors by using the A,„ax and A,race tests.
Table 6.8 - ^  statistics calculated for the nine 
nominal exchange rate indices of France for the 
test of long-run exclusion
Exch. Rates ?
Fra. Franc/A us. Sch illing 5 4 .1 0
Fra. Franc/Bel.& Lux. Franc 89 .28
Fra. Franc/Fin. Markka 4 0 .5 4
Fra. Franc/Ger. Mark 40 .47
Fra. Franc/Ire. Pound 58.31
Fra. Franc/Ita. Lira 4 0 .7 8
Fra. Franc/Net. Guilder 79 .36
Fra. Franc/Por. E scudo 58.31
Fra. Franc/Spa. Peseta 4 5 .0 0
The results for the test of long-run exclusion indicate that it is not possible to 
exclude any of the variables from the long-run analysis. The critical values with 8
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degrees of freedom are 20.09 for 1%, 15.51 for 5%, and 13.36 for 10% levels of 
significance. The calculated ^  values are given in Table 6.8 above.
2.5 Germany
The results of the prior tests indicate that an I(i) model with a constant and
trend in the cointegrating relations should be used for the German data.
Table 6,9 ~ The test statistics calculated for 
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for 
the German data
ffo r^ace
r=0 160.93 5 35 .59
r=l 117.76 374 .67
r=2 82 .49 2 5 6 .9 0
r=3 50 .68 174.41
r=4 4 7 .65 m i l l
r=5 3 3 .0 0 76 .07
r=6 2 2 .28 43 .07
r=l 15.76 20 .79
r=8 5 .02 5 .02
As in the previous sections, X,„ax and X,race tests are used to determine the 
number of cointegrating vectors. At 90% level of significance, X„uce test indicates 
that the cointegrating rank is 7 when the null hypothesis of r=7 is tested against the 
alternative r^l. However, A,„ax test results in rejecting the null of r=l against the 
alternative r=8. Enders points to this problem and notes that '%„ax test has a sharper 
alternative and it is usually preferred to pin down the number of cointegrating 
vectors” (p.393). Adopting the suggestions of Hansen and Juselius (1995), the 
cointegrating rank is 7 in this case.
Table 6.10 below gives the statistics calculated to test the long-run 
exclusion both for 7 and 8 cointegrating vectors. The critical % values for 7 degrees 
of freedom are 18.47, 14.07, and 12.02 and for 8 degrees of freedom are 20.09,
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15.51, and 13.36 for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
Therefore, it is not possible to exclude any of the exchange rate indices from the 
long-run analysis.
Table 6.10 - ^  statistics calculated for the nine 
nominal exchange rate indices o f Germany for 
the test of long-run exclusion
Exch. Rates ? 7
Gcr. M ark/Aus. Schilling 5 8 .0 6 67 .58
Ger. M ark/Bel.& Lux. Franc 86 .68 99 .99
Ger. Mark/Fin. Markka 26 .94 40 .73
Ger. Mark/Fra. Franc 7 6 .8 0 90 .24
Ger. Mark/Ire. Pound 5 5 .2 4 66 .14
Ger. Mark/Ita. Lira 33 .85 4 6 .5 6
Ger. M ark/Net. Guilder 75 .88 86 .74
Ger. Mark/Por. Escudo 45 .63 59 .29
Ger. Mark/Spa. Peseta 5 5 .0 0 5 9 .0 0
2.6 Ireland
The model adopted for the Irish data according to the test results is an 1(7) 
model with a constant term restricted in the cointegrating relations. The results of 
this model are summarised in Table 6.11.
As in the previous section, Á,„ax and X,race tests give different results about the 
rank of 77 Similarly, at 90% level of significance, Á,race test results in failing to 
reject the null hypothesis of r=l against the alternative riH. However, A,,,ax test 
rejects the null of r=7 against the alternative r=8. Again adopting the suggestions of 
Hansen and Juselius (1995), the cointegrating rank is chosen as 7.
The results for the test of long-run exclusion are rather interesting in this 
case. At any conventional level of significance, it is not possible to include the 
nominal bilateral exchange rate between Irish pound and Italian lira in the long-run 
analysis. The results of this test are tabulated below (see Table 6.12).
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Table 6,11 - The test statistics calculated for 
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for 
the Irish data: Model
^nax
r=0 126.97 4 74 .89
119.73 347 .93
r=2 7 5 .2 0 228 .19
r=3 5 0 .6 6 152.99
r=A 3 8 .9 6 102.33
r=5 3 0 .44 63 .37
r=6 19.84 32.93
r=l 11.73 13.10
r=8 1.37 \31
Table 6,12 - statistics calculated for the nine
nominal exchange rate indices o f Ireland for the 
test of long-run exclusion: 7 '^  Model
Exch. Rates ?
Ire. Pound/Aus. S ch illing 48 .05
Ire. Pound/Bel.& Lux. Franc 76 .07
Ire. Pound/Fin. Markka 36.55
Ire. Pound/Fra. Franc 66 .93
Ire. Pound/Ger. Mark 42 .35
Ire. Pound/Ita. Lira 0 .16
Ire. Pound/Net. Guilder 75.91
Ire. Pound/Por. Escudo 75 .88
Ire. Pound/Spa. Peseta 4 7 .0 0
Therefore, the model is re-estimated excluding the nominal bilateral 
exchange rate between Irish pound and Italian lira. Again, the tests prior to analysis 
indicated that the model to be used is an 1(7) model with a constant term restricted 
in the cointegrating relations.
Table 6,13 - The test statistics calculated for  
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for 
the Irish data: Model
Ho ^nax r^ace
r=0 128.38 430.41
r=l 106.30 302 .04
r=2 72 .75 195.74
f^3 4 8 .6 0 122.98
r=4 28 .78 74 .38
r=5 2 7 .8 9 4 5 .6 0
r=6 16.28 17.71
r=l 1.44 1.44
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The A„,ax and Atrace tests lead us to choose the cointegrating rank as 7. In 
addition, the tests for long-run exclusion indicate that all the remaining variables are 
relevant in long-run relations.
Table 6.14 - ^  statistics calculated for the nine 
nominal exchange rate indices of Ireland for the 
test of long-run exclusion: 2'“' Model
Exch. Rates ?
Ire. Pound/Aus. Sch illing 42 .28
Ire. Pound/Bel.& Lux. Franc 83 .38
Ire. Pound/Fin. Markka 4 3 .45
Ire. Pound/Fra. Franc 72.91
Ire. Pound/Ger. Mark 34 .67
Ire. Pound/Net. Guilder 7 0 .62
Ire. Pound/Por. Escudo 70.51
Ire. Pound/Spa. Peseta 50 .87
2.7 Italy
According to the results of tests done prior to the analysis, an 1(7) model 
with no deterministic components is fit to the Italian data. The results of A„,ax and 
Airace tests indicate that there are 8 distinct cointegrating relations. Table 6.15 
provides the calculated values of A,„ax and Atrace· There is no evidence that any of the
exchange rate indices are irrelevant for the long-run analysis (see Table 6.16).
Table 6.15 - The test statistics calculated for 
respective values o f r under the null hypothesis for 
the Italian data
^mi.x r^ace
r=0 126.58 4 6 5 .9 2
r=l 110.72 3 3 9 .3 4
r=2 76 .38 228 .63
r=3 51 .73 152.24
r=4 38 .80 100.52
r=5 31 .04 6 1 .7 2
r=6 19.59 30 .68
r=l 9.61 11.09
r=i 1.48 1.48
The critical values for 8 degrees of freedom are 20.09, 15.51, and 13.36 
for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 6,16 - ^  statistics calculated for the nine 
nominal exchange rate indices of Italy for the 
test of long-run exclusion
Exch. Rates ?
Ita. Lira/Aus. Schilling 54 .03
Ita. Lira/Bel.& Lux. Franc 75 .23
Ita. Lira/Fin Markka 37.85
Ita. Lira/Fra. Franc 75.51
Ita. Lira/Ger. Mark 38 .42
Ita. Lira/Ire. Pound 6 8 .1 0
Ita. Lira/Net. Guilder 72 .57
Ita. Lira/Por. Escudo 60.11
Ita. Lira/Spa. Peseta 5 1 .0 0
2.8 The Netherlands
Table 6.17 below presents the Á^nax and Átrace test statistics calculated for nine
nominal bilateral exchange rate indices for Dutch guilder in an 1(7) model which
includes a constant and a trend in the cointegrating relations.
Table 6,17 ~ The test statistics calculated for 
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for 
the Dutch data
Ho ^nax r^ace
r=0 164.33 589 .65
r=l 142.82 4 2 5 .3 2
r=2 78 .84 2 8 2 .5 0
r=7> 58 .93 2 03 .66
r=A 4 7 .3 0 144.73
r=5 42 .87 97 .43
r=6 27 .79 54 .56
r=l 17.12 26 .77
9.65 9 .65
Table 6,18 - statistics calculated for the nine
nominal exchange rate indices o f the Netherlands 
for the test of long-run exclusion
Exch. Rates /
N et. G uilder/Aus. Sch illing 67.11
N et. G uilder/Bel.& L ux. Franc 99 .35
N et. Guilder/Fin. Markka 39 .29
N et. Guilder/Fra. Franc 89 .30
N et. Guilder/Ger. Mark 53 .37
N et. Guilder/Ire. Pound 66 .84
N et. Guilder/Ita. Lira 48.71
N et. Guilder/Por. E scudo 57 .28
N et. Guilder/Spa. Peseta 5 8 .0 0
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Both A,„ax and A,r„ce tests indicate that the rank of /7 matrix is equal to 8, that 
is, there are 8 linearly independent cointegrating relations. The tests for long-run 
exclusion show that all the variables should be included in the long-run analysis. 
See Table 6.18 for the calculated values with 8 degrees of freedom.
2.9 Portugal
An 1(7) model without any deterministic components is used in this section 
to analyse the Portuguese data.
Table 6,19 - The test statistics calculated for 
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for 
the Portuguese data
t^ULX r^ace
n=0 111.77 425 .43
r=l 98 .64 313 .67
r=2 59.05 215.0.3
r=3 4 8 .05 155.98
r=4 .39.28 107.93
r=5 .33.13 68 .65
r=6 2 0 .76 35 .52
r=l 13.5.3 14.76
r=^ 1.23 1.2.3
Table 6,20 - statistics calculated for the nine 
nominal exchange rate indices of Portugal for 
the test o f long-run exclusion
Exch. Rates 9......... z .......
Por. E scudo/A us. Schilling 5 0 .07
Por. E scudo/B el.& L ux. Franc 88 .65
Por. Escudo/Fin. Markka 4 4 .7 6
Por. Escudo/Fra. Franc 88 .42
Por. Escudo/G er. Mark 35.93
Por. Escudo/Ire. Pound 78 .46
Por. Escudo/Ita. Lira 4 1 .8 4
Por. Escudo/N et. Guilder 61 .74
Por. E scudo/Spa. Peseta 5 4 .0 0
The results of X,„ax and Xrace statistics are summarised in the table above. 
They both indicate that there exist 8 distinct cointegrating vectors in the Portuguese
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data. In addition to these findings, it is not possible to exclude any of the variables 
from the long-run analysis at any conventional significance level. The ^  statistics 
with 8 degrees of freedom calculated for this test are summarised in the table above.
2.10 Spain
The tests prior to the analysis indicate that the Spanish data is not
cointegrated because all variables are stationary. The results for this test are
summarised in Table 6.21 where Model 1 is an I(i) model without any deterministic
components, Model 2 is an 1(7) model with constants in the cointegrating relations.
Model 3 is an 1(7) model with unrestricted constant, and Model 4 is an 1(7) model
which includes a constant and a trend in the cointegrating relations:
Table 6.21 - The 2,ruce test statistics calculated for 
respective values of r for determining the model 
and the cointegrating rank the Spanish data
H o Model I Model! Model 3 Mode 14
r=0 4 5 7 .5 0 5 14 .84 4 99 .85 539 .89
r=\ 331 .38 379 .75 .365.31 4 0 4 .8 0
r=2 236 .06 264.81 251 .89 276 .47
r=3 165.04 192.50 184.11 207 .64
r=4 114.82 142.27 134.11 150.77
r=5 7 7 .2 0 101..37 93 .22 103.76
r=6 4 2 .1 9 54 .63 56 .52 66.41
r=l 18.64 29 .68 22 .85 31 .70
n=S 3.06 11.62 4 .8 9 13.47
Comparing these values with the critical values (Hansen and Juselius, 1995), it 
is not possible to find any cointegrating relations present in the data. In fact these 
results indicate that the rank of 77 is 9, that is, 77 has full rank. The interpretation of 
these is that all the variables are stationary and that they form a system of 
convergent difference equations.
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3. Conclusion
Except for the Irish data, the results were in accordance with the 
expectations. Since these countries are members of the ERM, their currencies are 
not allowed to fluctuate freely against each other. Instead, they are limited to wander 
around a central rate. In addition, Maastricht Treaty requires exchange rate 
convergence. Therefore, the currencies of the member states are expected to be 
cointegrated in order for them to have a permanent long-run relationship.
The empirical findings of this chapter indicate that these expectations are 
true for Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. For Ireland, the nominal bilateral exchange rate 
between Irish pound and Italian lira turned out to be irrelevant for the long-run 
relationship, and thus excluded from the analysis. The tests for the Spanish data 
indicated that there exists no cointegration among the nominal bilateral exchange 
rates because the variables are stationary, and therefore, they form a convergent 
system of stationary variables.
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the nominal bilateral exchange rates 
among the eleven states of the euro zone are convergent in the long-run.
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CHAPTER VII: REAL EXCHANGE RATES OF THE EMU 
STATES
The previous chapters adopted cointegration analyses for the price indices 
and the nominal bilateral exchange rates of the euro area. This chapter will adopt a 
similar analysis for the real bilateral exchange rates of Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
As discussed before, the real exchange rate is a key indicator of a country’s 
competitiveness. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the competitiveness of 
each EMU State against the others and find the misalignments, if any.
The real exchange rate indices used in this section are calculated according 
to equation 3.1. The nominal bilateral exchange rates used in this formula come 
from the same data set as in the previous chapter.
The real exchange rate series seem to have no deterministic trends and 
therefore, the models are adopted accordingly (see Appendix B for figures and 
method of calculations).
1. The Statistical Model and the Tests for Determining the Cointegrating 
Rank:
The statistical model used in this chapter is identical to the model adopted for 
the analyses of nominal bilateral exchange rates in the previous chapter; described by 
equations 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. The /L,ax and Ai,-ace tests explained in section 5.2 
will also be adopted in this chapter.
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2. Estimation Results:
The bilateral real exchange rates are analysed for each of the eleven EMU 
countries. The results are summarised in the following sections. The data vector 
consists of the bilateral real exchange rates calculated using equation 3.1 of Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain against each other.
2.1 Austria
Depending on the results of prior tests, a model without any deterministic 
terms is adopted for the Austrian real exchange rate data.
According to the estimated output, the calculated A,„ax and Jl,mce statistics
which are summarised in table 7.1 indicate that the cointegrating rank r is 9.
Table 7.1 - The test statistics calculated for 
respective values o f r under the null hypothesis for 
the Austrian data
n^a.x r^ace
r=0 127.17 557 .25
r=l 116.65 4 30 .08
r=2 7 3 .17 313 .43
r=3 6 4 .7 6 240 .25
r=4 53 .78 175.50
r=5 37 .49 121.72
r=6 35 26 84 .23
r=7 3 2 .6 6 48 .97
r=8 15.49 16.31
r=9 0 .8 2 0 .8 2
The results for the test of long-run exclusion indicate that it is not possible to 
exclude any of the variables from the long-run analysis. See the calculated values 
(Table 7.2 below) when compared with the critical values with 9 degrees of freedom 
which are 21.66 for 1%, 16.92 for 5%, and 14.69 for 10% levels of significance.
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Therefore, it is possible to conclude that nine nominal bilateral exchange
rates for Austria has a linear equilibrium relationship in the long-run and it is not
possible to exclude any of them from the analysis.
Table 7.2 - ^  statistics calculated for the nine 
real exchange rate indices o f Austria for the test 
of long-run exclusion
Exch. Rates ?
A us. Sch illing/B el. Franc 27 .60
A us. Schilling/Fin. Markka 54.41
A us. Schilling/Fra. Franc 65 .59
A us. Schilling/G er. Mark 83 .97
A us. Schilling/Ire. Pound 52 .08
A us. Schilling/Ita. Lira 4 3 .6 9
A us. Schilling/L ux. Franc 33 .46
A us. Schilling/N et. Guilder 75 .99
A us. Schilling/Por. Escudo 3 5 .00
A us. Schilling/Spa. Peseta 6 6 .0 0
2.2 Belgium
Atnax and Airace tcsts indicate that the cointegrating rank is 9 for Belgian data. 
Besides, it is not possible to exclude any of the exchange rate indices from the long- 
run relationship. Table 7.3 summarises the A,,u,x and A,race test statistics calculated for 
the data, and 7.4 provides the calculated values of the statistics for the test of 
long-run exclusion. According to the tests done prior to the analysis, an 1(7) model 
without any deterministic components is adopted for Belgium.
Table 7,3 - The test statistics calculated for 
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for 
the Belgium data
^mi.x r^ace
r=Q 132.49 6 05 .48
r=l 118.99 4 7 2 .9 9
r=2 94.41 3 5 4 .0 0
r=3 69.41 2 59 .59
r=4 59.41 190.19
r=5 52.11 130.78
r=6 34.08 7 8 .6 7
r=l 26.91 4 4 .5 8
/^ 8 15.19 17.68
r=9 2.48 2 .48
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Table 7.4 - ;jf statistics calculated for the nine 
real exchange rate indices of Belgium for the test 
of long-run exclusion
ExcIl Rates .............¿.....
Bel. Franc/Aus. Sch illing 75 .46
Bel. Franc/Fin. Markka 55..30
Bel. Franc/Fra. Franc 67 .03
B el. Franc/Ger. Mark 87.75
B el. Franc/Ire. Pound 5 1 .44
B el. Franc/Ita. Lira 42 .67
Bel. Franc/Lux. Franc 39 .00
Bel. Franc/Net. Guilder 73 .99
Bel. Franc/Por. Escudo 29 .00
Bel. Franc/Spa. Peseta 6 4 .0 0
2.3 Finland
Prior testing indicates a model similar to the one adopted for both Austrian 
and Belgian real exchange rates in the previous sections: an 1(7) model without any 
deterministic terms. The estimation results are presented in Table 7.5 below for the 
real bilateral exchange rates of Finland. These results lead us to determine the rank 
of the TJmatrix as 9 by using the ^mix and Átrace tests.
Table 7.5 - The test statistics calculated for  
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for 
the Finnish data
H o ^m ix ^race
r=0 137.67 5 74 .10
r=l 122.12 436 .43
r=2 80.73 314.31
r^3 72 .75 233 .58
r=4 53 .82 160.82
r=5 42 .19 107.00
r=6 24 .42 64.81
r=l 24 .04 40 .38
/= 8 16.17 16.34
r=9 0 .17 0 .17
The results of the long-run exclusion test lead us to conclude at all 
conventional levels of significance that all the nine series should be included in the
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of freedom calculated from the data (see Table 7.6).
Table 7.6- statistics calculated for the nine 
nominal exchange rate indices of Finland for the 
test of long-run exclusion
analysis of long-run relations as can be observed from the X  statistics with 9 degrees
Exch. Rates /
Fin. M arkka/Aus. Sch illing 48 .06
Fin. M arkka/Bel. Franc 22 .69
Fin. Markka/Fra. Franc 49 .83
Fin. Markka/Ger. Mark 79 .50
Fin. Markka/Ire. Pound 4 5 .1 7
Fin. Markka/Ita. Lira 38 .68
Fin. Markka/Lux. Franc 29 .67
Fin. M arkka/Net. Guilder 71 .20
Fin. Markka/Por. Escudo 29 .00
Fin. Markka/Spa. Peseta 4 5 .0 0
2.4 France
For the bilateral real exchange rates of France, again an 1(7) model that 
includes no deterministic components was adopted. Á,„ax and Á,nwe test statistics
calculated are presented in Table 7.7 below.
Table 7.7 - The test statistics calculated for  
respective values o f r under the null hypothesis for 
the French data
n^a.x ^nicr
r=0 1.33.90 568 .15
r=\ 126.07 4 3 4 .2 4
r=2 85.05 308 .17
/= 3 63.51 2 23 .12
r=4 4 9 .0 7 159.61
r=5 36 .44 110.54
r=6 35.01 74.11
r=7 21.75 39 .10
r=S 17.26 17..35
r=9 0.08 0 .08
The A,nax and X,race test statistics reported above indicate that there exists 9 
linearly independent cointegrating relations in the data. Furthermore, the results for 
the test of long-run exclusion indicate that it is not possible to exclude any of the
.55
variables from the long-run analysis when the calculated values that are given in
Table 7.8 below are compared with the critical ^  values with 9 degrees of freedom.
Table 7.8 - statistics calculated for the nine 
real exchange rate indices of France for the test 
of long-run exclusion
Exch. Rates
Fra. Franc/Aus. Sch illing 72 .07
Fra. Franc/Bel. Franc 26 .08
Fra. Franc/Fin. Markka 58 .57
Fra. Franc/Ger. Mark 86 .84
Fra. Franc/Ire. Pound 53 .64
Fra. Franc/Ita. Lira 41 .53
Fra. Franc/Lux. Franc 36 .74
Fra. Franc/Net. Guilder 75 .68
Fra. Franc/Por. E scudo 31 .00
Fra. Franc/Spa. Peseta 6 1 .0 0
2.5 Germany
The results of the cointegration analysis of the real bilateral exchange rates 
of Germany using an 1(7) model without any deterministic components are tabulated 
below:
Table 7.9 - The test statistics calculated for 
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for 
the German data
Ho r^ace
r=0 129.28 5 40 .39
r=\ 100.87 411.11
r=2 75.51 310 .23
r=3 6 1 .48 2 34 .73
r=4 4 9 .8 9 173.24
r=5 4 0 .2 8 123.35
r=6 35 .43 83 .06
r=l 3 1 .5 0 47 .63
r=8 15.63 16.13
0 .4 9 0 .4 9
The Anua and Átmce statistics indicate that the rank of /7 is 9, that is, there exist 
9 linearly independent long-run equilibrium relations among the real bilateral 
exchange rates of Germany. In addition, there is no evidence to prove that any of
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7.10 have 9 degrees of freedom.
Table 7,10 ~ ^  statistics calculated for the nine 
nominal exchange rate indices of Germany for 
the test of long-run exclusion
these variables are irrelevant in the long-run analysis. The statistics given in Table
Exch. Rates
Ger. M ark/Aus. Schilling 64 .78
Ger. M ark/Bel. Franc 26 .25
Ger. Mark/Fin. Markka 55 .67
Ger. Mark/Fra. Franc 6 5 .3 2
Ger. Mark/Ire. Pound 5 1 .7 0
Ger. Mark/Ita. Lira 40.21
Ger. Mark/Lux. Franc 32.61
Ger. M ark/Net. Guilder 78.21
Ger. Mark/Por. Escudo 3 4 .0 0
Ger. Mark/Spa. Peseta 6 6 .0 0
2.6 Ireland
The A„,ax and Xrace statistics, which are given in Table 7.11, indicate that the
cointegrating rank is 9 for the Irish real exchange rates when an I(i) model without
any deterministic components is used for the analysis.
Table 7.11 · The test statistics calculated for  
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for  
the Irish data: T' Model
n^a.x r^ace
r=0 133.03 5 74 .46
r=\ 120.30 4 4 1 .4 2
r=2 87.03 3 21 .12
r=3 6 4 .67 2 34 .09
r=4 55.25 169.42
r=5 36 .84 114.17
r=6 34 .58 77 .33
r=l 26 .33 42 .75
n=S 16.41 16.42
r=9 0.01 0.01
The calculated values when compared with the critical values with 9 
degrees of freedom, which are 21.66, 16.92, and 14.69 for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
of significance respectively, indicate that at the 1% level we end up excluding 
Belgium from the long-run analysis (see Table 7.12).
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Table 7,12 ~ ^  statistics calculated for the nine 
real exchange rate indices of Ireland for the test 
of long-run exclusion: /  Model
Exch. Rates ?
Ire. Pound/Aus. Sch illing 52 .50
Ire. Pound/Bel. Franc 21 .30
Ire. Pouncl/Fin. Markka 4 5 .2 2
Ire. Pound/Fra. Franc 59.85
Ire. Pound/Ger. Mark 75 .94
Ire. Pound/Ita. Lira 39.93
Ire. Pound/Lux. Franc 22 .95
Ire. Pound/Net. Guilder 71 .92
Ire. Pound/Por. E scudo 35 .00
Ire. Pound/Spa. Peseta 57 .00
Table 7.13 - The test statistics calculated for 
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for
the Irish data: Model
^mix r^ace
r=0 135.51 460 .63
r=l 101.21 325 .12
r=2 57 .57 2 23 .92
r=3 52 .67 166.34
r=4 4 1 .6 9 113.67
r=5 32 .12 71 .98
r=6 21 .37 39 .86
r=l 17.73 18.50
r=8 0 .7 6 0 .76
Table 7.14 - statistics calculated for the nine 
real exchange rate indices of Ireland for the test 
of long-run exclusion:T'^ Model
Exch. Rates /
Ire. Pound/Aus. Sch illing 59 .88
Ire. Pound/Fin. Markka 37 .26
Ire. Pound/Fra. Franc 6 4 .7 0
Ire. Pound/Ger. Mark 71 .38
Ire. Pound/Ita. Lira 4 2 .6 7
Ire. Pound/Lux. Franc 54.01
Ire. Pound/Net. Guilder 63 .15
Ire. Pound/Por. E scudo 4 9 .2 2
Ire. Pound/Spa. Peseta 73 .00
Therefore, the model is re-estimated excluding Belgium. According to the 
results of this model, it can be concluded that the cointegrating rank is 8, the 
variables are cointegrated although the bilateral real exchange rate of Irish pound 
versus Belgian franc is no more present in this long-run relationship. In addition, the
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model is re-analysed for long-run exelusion and all variables are found to be relevant 
for the long-run analysis. The results of this second model are summarised in Tables 
7.13 and 7.14 which are given above.
2.7 Italy
The model adopted for the Italian real exchange rate indices is the same as 
the previous ones, without any deterministic components. The A,„ax and Afmce
statistics both show that the cointegrating rank is 9.
Table 7J5 - The test statistics calculated for 
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for 
the Italian data
^nax r^ace
r=0 144.74 593.11
r=\ 125.20 4 48 .38
r=2 1%A1 323 .17
r=3 6 9 .7 6 244 .75
r=4 51.10 174.99
r=5 3 9 .8 0 117.29
r=6 34 .87 77 .49
n=7 2 5 .4 2 4 2 .6 2
r=S 16.54 17.20
r=9 0 .6 6 0 .66
Table 7.16 - statistics calculated for the nine 
real exchange rate indices of Italy for the test of 
long-run exclusion
Exch. Rates ?
Ita. Lira/Aus. Sch illing 63 .32
Ita. Lira/Bel. Franc 30 .32
Ita. Lira/Fin Markka 4 6 .6 4
Ita. Lira/Fra. Franc 52 .07
Ita. Lira/Ger. Mark 83 .52
Ita. Lira/Ire. Pound 43.31
Ita. Lira/Lux. Franc 38 .82
Ita. Lira/Net. Guilder 7 5 .9 0
Ita. Lira/Por. E scudo 30 .00
Ita. Lira/Spa. Peseta 62 .00
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The results of the long-run exclusion test indicate that none of the variables 
can be excluded from the analysis. See Table 7.16 for the calculated values with 
9 degrees of freedom.
2.8 Luxembourg
The tests prior to the analysis indicate that the Luxembourg data is
stationary. The results are provided in Table 7.17. The models are identical to those
in section 3.10 of Chapter VI. Comparing the values in Table 7.17 with the critical
values (Hansen and Juselius, 1995), the rank of 77is found to be 10, that is, 77has
full rank. Therefore, all the variables are stationary and they form a system of
convergent difference equations.
Table 7.17 - The A,race test statistics calculated for  
respective values of r for determining the model 
and the cointegrating rank the Luxembourg data
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
r=0 595 .047 6 4 9 .432 6 28 .874 6 6 4 .466
r=\ 4 6 3 .799 514 .423 4 9 5 .3 1 6 5 3 0 .904
r=2 352 .834 388.083 3 72 .476 406 .873
/^ 3 2 6 5 .0 2 0 292 .466 2 7 8 .626 309 .005
r=4 194.195 220 .136 2 0 8 .274 2 2 9 .312
r=5 132.277 155.431 147 .982 167.737
r=6 8 0 .830 103.483 99 .233 118.285
r=l 4 6 .6 4 4 6 8 .907 6 4 .6 5 9 71.811
r=8 18.863 36 .333 3 5 .898 4 0 .1 2 9
r=9 3 .650 15.188 14.779 15.088
2.9 The Netherlands
The results of the prior tests indicated that an 1(7) model that does not have 
any deterministic components should be fit to the Dutch data. According to this 
model, the calculated À,„ax and Àmice statistics are shown in Table 7.18 below.
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At any conventional significance level, it is possible to choose the 
cointegrating rank as 9 as a result of both tests. In addition, the calculated x" 
statistics with 9 degrees of freedom (see Table 7.19) indicate that none of the real 
exchange rate indices can be excluded from the long-run analysis.
Table 7.18 - The test statistics calculated for 
respective values of r under the null hypothesis for 
the Dutch data
t^ia.v
r=0 137.45 5 52 .82
r=l 100.43 4 15 .37
r=2 87.61 314 .94
r=3 61 .94 227 .33
r=4 4 9 .4 0 165.39
r=5 35 .76 115.99
r=6 35 .12 80.23
r=l 28 .38 4 5 .1 0
16.72 16.73
/= 9 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Table 7.19 - ^  statistics calculated for the nine 
real exchange rate indices of the Netherlands for 
the test of long-run exclusion
Exch. Rates
Net. G uilder/A us. Sch illing
............ .............
64.71
Net. G uilder/Bel. Franc 26.11
Net. Guilder/Fin. Markka 52 .84
Net. Guilder/Fra. Franc 65 .07
Net. Guilder/Ger. Mark 83.33
Net. Guilder/Ire. Pound 51 .34
Net. Guilder/Ita. Lira 4 1 .0 2
Net. Guilder/Lux. Franc 31 .76
Net. Guilder/Por. E scudo 33 .00
Net. G uilder/Spa. Peseta 6 6 .0 0
2.10 Portugal
Similar to the real exchange rate indices of Luxembourg, the tests prior to 
the analysis indicate that the Portuguese data is also stationary (see Table 7.20).
When these values in Table 7.20 are compared with the critical values given 
by Hansen and Juselius (1995), the rank of /7 is found to be 10, that is, 77 has full
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rank. This shows that all the variables are stationary and that they form a system of
convergent difference equations.
Table 7.20 - The A,r„ce test statistics calculated for  
respective values of r for determining the model 
and the cointegrating rank the Portuguese data
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
n=0 577 .475 615 .489 584 .674 625 .047
r=\ 455.8.33 4 89 .008 4 5 8 .456 498 .188
r=2 342 .844 369 .725 351 .482 391 .002
r=3 255 .766 282 .182 263 .938 293 .866
r=4 181.421 207 .608 195..348 216.213
r=5 126.246 150.514 142.777 162.295
r=6 77.881 101.996 9 4 .539 113.414
r=l 4 4 .188 6 7 .999 6 0 .5 6 0 74 .213
r=S 19.860 36.111 33.111 4 3 .5 5 6
r=9 3 .530 15.990 14.690 16.109
2.11 Spain
The Spanish data is found to be stationary in the tests prior to the analysis 
and hence, not cointegrated. /7 is found to be having full rank. Thus, the data forms 
a system of convergent difference equations, as the Luxembourg and Portuguese 
data. See Table 7.21 for the results.
Table 7.21 - The test statistics calculated for
respective values of r for determining the model 
and the cointegrating rank the Spanish data
H„ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
r=Q 547 .763 6 21 .540 597 .883 6 3 7 .110
r=\ 418 .048 490 .913 4 7 2 .2 0 4 510 .940
r=2 308 .706 370 .283 3 5 6 .030 393.618
r=3 236 .542 286 .104 271.851 297 .012
r=A 174.492 214 .015 202 .143 2 21 .350
n=5 119.133 152.150 145 .022 161.706
r=6 75 .948 102.337 9 5 .6 1 9 111.188
r=l 4 1 .2 8 2 65.171 5 8 .528 6 7 .526
/^ 8 17.986 37 .428 34 .953 37 .036
r=9 3 .660 14.139 13.432 14.775
Comparing the values in Table 7.21 with the critical values given by Hansen 
and Juselius (1995), the rank of /7 is found to be 10 i.e. 77 has full rank.
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3. Conclusion
The empirical findings of this chapter indicate that the real bilateral 
exchange rate indices of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain are convergent among each 
other.
In fact, the data for Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain were found to be 
stationary, and therefore they form systems of convergent difference equations. For 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and Italy, the real bilateral exchange 
rate indices are cointegrated, and so they are related in the long-run.
For the Irish data, the real exchange rate between Ireland and Belgium is 
found to be irrelevant in the long-run analysis at 1% significance level, and thus 
excluded from the long-run analysis. The data was found to be cointegrated after the 
exclusion of this index. However, if we do not exclude the real exchange rate index 
of Ireland against Belgium at other conventional levels of significance, the data is 
again cointegrated.
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that for each EMU country, the real 
bilateral exchange rates against other ten countries have a long-run equilibrium 
relationship, that is, they are convergent. This result is rather expected because in 
the previous chapters, it is found that the nominal bilateral exchange rates and prices 
are convergent in the long-run. In addition, inflation convergence and nominal 
exchange rate convergence are required by the Maastricht Treaty. Since real 
exchange rate is an important measure of competitiveness, the empirical findings of 
this chapter indicate that the level of competitiveness of each country participating 
in the EMU against others is also convergent.
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CHAPTER VIII: DOES PPP HOLD?
To determine whether the PPP hypothesis holds for the new currency against 
the US dollar, Japanese yen and Turkish lira, three real exchange rate indices for 
euro are calculated using equation (3.1). However, the price index in euros and the 
nominal exchange rate indices of US dollar, Turkish lira, and Japanese yen against 
euro are not available. Therefore, the first step is to calculate a price index and 
nominal exchange rate indices for the new euro zone.
The existing currency unit of the European Union, ECU, includes the 
currencies of non-participating countries as the British pound, Danish krone, and 
Greek drachma, whereas Austrian schilling and Finnish markka are not contained in 
the composition of the ECU. This rules out the possibility of using ECU price index. 
The weights of the currencies forming ECU are determined by the trade volume of 
the respective countries. Thus, a similar method is adopted here; the weights of each 
country’s price index in the composite price index are decided according to its trade 
volume. The same weights are used in calculating nominal exchange rate indices of 
euro against the US dollar, Japanese yen, and Turkish lira. The description of the 
calculations and the respective weights are given in Appendix C.
After calculating the indices, equation (3.1) is adopted for the US dollar, 
Japanese yen and Turkish lira, so three real exchange rate series are calculated. 
Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 show the three real exchange rate indices: euro for US 
dollar, euro for Japanese yen, and euro for Turkish lira respectively. If the PPP 
hypothesis holds, the real exchange rate will fluctuate around “ 1.”
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Figure 8.1 - The real exchange rate index of euro for US dollar
In order to test whether PPP holds, one should determine whether the changes 
in the real exchange rate are permanent or temporary. Temporary changes in real 
exchange rate imply that PPP holds in the long-run whereas permanent changes 
mean that PPP does not hold either in the short-run or in the long-run. If the changes 
are permanent, the real exchange rate index should exhibit a random walk.
( r , - r )  = a ( f _ ^ - r )  + £, (8.1)
where, r real exchange rate at time t,
r : long-run equilibrium level of real multilateral exchange rate,
£,: random disturbance term at time t (assume: cov (r e, ~ N(0,a^)).
After all those assumptions are made, “a” determines the long-run behaviour 
of the real exchange rate.
If “a” takes a value between 0 and 1, the process is stable and assuming there 
is no random disturbance term, the real exchange rate will converge and eventually 
be equal to its long-run equilibrium level. Thus, under those conditions, (r, - r ) is a
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temporary deviation. If “a” is equal to 1, the process is a random walk and there is 
no such long-run value to which r, will converge (Selçuk, 1993).
To determine whether the real exchange rate indices are random walk 
processes, the equation below is estimated using the least squares method for each of 
the three series:
Jc
Alnr,=j3o + rln  r,_, + ^  p.A In r,_, + e,
i=1
(8.2)
A denotes first differences, Inr, denotes the value of the natural logarithm of 
the r series at time t, and e, is a white noise random disturbance. Enough lags of the 
dependent variable should be included to remove autocorrelation.
Below is the estimation output for the period of January 1980-December 
1997 of the euro/$ real exchange rate, denoted by i/: "'
MnU, = -0 .0 0 6 -0 .0 2 8  lnU,_^+0.358A i n u , (8.3)
If 7 is not significantly different from zero, the process is a random walk, 
meaning PPP does not hold. In order to test the random walk hypothesis, the Dickey- 
Fuller test is used. The f-statistic calculated for “)4=0” is equal to -2.85. Thus, the null 
hypothesis of a random walk could not be rejected at 5% and 1% levels of 
significance while we can reject the presence of a unit root at 10% when t-statistic is 
compared to the Dickey-Fuller critical values (Enders, 1995).
Similar testing procedures are repeated for euro/yen and euro/TL real 
exchange rate indices. The results for the euro/yen real exchange rate series for the 
same period are:^
 ^ Insignificant variables are excluded. 
® Insignificant variables are excluded.
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AlnJ, = -0 .0 0 5 -0 .0 1 6 InJ,_^ + 0 .4 1 1 A ln J ,_ ^ -0 .1 4 2 A !n J (8.4)
where J denotes the euro/yen real exchange rate. The null hypothesis of a unit root 
cannot be rejected at any conventional level of significance when the calculated t- 
statistic (-2.45) for ‘Y’ is compared with the critical Dickey-Fuller values.
For the period between 1980-1997, the data for the euro/TL real exchange 
rate index also indicates the failure of rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance:^
A//7 T; =0.001 -0.018lnT,_^ +0.395AlnT,_^ -0.123AlnT,_3 (8.5)
Fgure 8,2 - The real exchange rate index of euro for Japanese yen
Thus, we can conclude that euro/$, euro/yen and euro/TL real exchange rate 
indices are non-stationary at 5% and 1% levels of significance. This means that PPP 
hypothesis does not hold for euro against US dollar, Japanese yen, and Turkish lira 
given the data set at 95% and 99% levels of confidence.
 ^Insignificant variables are excluded.
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In addition, the real exchange rate indices calculated indicate that euro is 
undervalued against US dollar, Japanese yen, and Turkish lira.
Figure 8.3 - The real exchange rate index of euro for Turkish lira
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CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION
This study aimed to investigate the long-run equilibrium relationships among 
prices and exchange rates of eleven countries that will participate in EMU on 1 
January 1999. The Maastricht Treaty, which is the basis of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), put forth some criteria to be met by 1998 for 
candidates to become a member of EMU. These requirements include inflation and 
interest rate convergence, exchange rate stability, and fiscal stability. Based on 
meeting these requirements, the European Commission recommended the European 
Council the membership of eleven countries by March 1998: Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain. On 2-3 May 1998, the European Council decided that these eleven 
countries will participate in EMU on 1 January 1999 and adopt euro as their single 
currency.
The empirical findings indicate that there exists a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among the eleven price indices of the EMU countries. Cointegration 
analysis was used for this purpose and the cointegrating rank was found to be 10, 
implying that there exists 10 linearly independent cointegrating relations among the 
price levels.
As the Maastricht Treaty required exchange rate convergence and 
membership to the ERM at least two years before the beginning of the third stage, 
the nominal bilateral exchange rates of the participating countries are expected to 
move together in the long-run. Again the cointegration analysis is used to analyse the 
nominal bilateral exchange rates. Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain are found to be satisfying these
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expectations, there is a small problem in the Irish data such that the nominal 
exchange rate of Irish pound/Italian lira is not relevant in the long-run equilibrium 
relationship.
The bilateral real exchange rates for these countries must converge if their 
prices and nominal exchange rates are converging. The seventh chapter focused on 
this issue by adopting cointegration analysis. For all the eleven EMU States, bilateral 
real exchange rates have an equilibrium relationship in the long-run. Therefore, it is 
possible to conclude that their real exchange rates are convergent.
It is possible to conclude that these eleven countries that will participate in 
EMU starting from 1 January 1999 meet the convergence criteria of the Maastricht 
Treaty for exchange rates and prices.
Finally, to find the alignment of the new currency, euro, against US dollar, 
Japanese yen and Turkish lira, the PPP hypothesis is tested for the three real 
exchange rate indices: euro versus US dollar, euro versus Japanese yen, euro versus 
Turkish lira. These tests indicated that the real exchange rates for euro against the 
US dollar, Japanese yen and Turkish lira are unit root processes. Therefore, it is 
possible to conclude that there is no evidence of PPP hypothesis in the long-run.
70
References:
Artis, MJ. (1990). “The European Monetary System.” In Economics of the 
European Community (3’^'* ed.) edited by A.M. El-Agraa, London: Phillip Allan.
Clark, P., L. Bartolini, T. Bayoumi, and S. Symansky (1994). '‘Exchange Rates and 
Economic Eundamentals: A Framework for Analysis”. Occasional Paper No:l 15, 
The International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., 1994.
Collins, C.D.E. (1990). “Social Policies.” In Economics of the European Community 
(3“* ed.) edited by A.M. El-Agraa, London: Phillip Allan.
Copeland, L.S. (1994). Exchange Rates and International Finance. Cornwall, GB: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company Inc.
De Grauwe, P. (1994). The Economics of Monetary Integration. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Dent, C.M. (1997). The European Economy: The Global Context. London: 
Routledge.
Devinney, T.M. and W.C. Hightower (1991). European Markets After 1992. 
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Dornbusch, R. (1976). “Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics”. Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 84, no. 6, pp. 1161-1176.
Dornbusch, R. (1988). “Purchasing Power Parity”. In Real Exchange Rates and 
Inflation, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993.
The Economist. Survey: EMU. April 11'*'- 17* 1998.
Edwards, S. (1996). “Exchange Rate Anchors, Credibility, and Inertia: A Tale of 
Two Crises, Chile and Mexico.” American Economic Association Papers and 
Proceedings, Vol. 86, No. 2, May 1996.
Enders, W. (1995). Applied Econometric Time Series, New York: John Wiley & 
Sons Inc.
Engle, R.F., and C.W.J. Granger (1987). “Co-integration and Error Correction, 
Representation, Estimation, and Testing.” Econometrica, vol. 55, No:2, 251-276.
European Commission (1998). Convergence Report 1998, 25 March 1998.
European Union (1998). Joint Communiqué on the Determination of The Irrevocable 
Conversion Rates for the Euro, 2 May 1998.
71
Hansen, H., and K. Juselius (1995). CATS in RATS: Cointegration Analysis of Time 
Series. Evanston, IL: Estima
Johansen, S. (1991). “Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in 
Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models.” Econometrica, vol. 59, No:6, 1551-1580.
Johansen, S. (1995). Likelihood-Based Inference In Cointegrated Vector 
Autoregressive Models. Advanced Texts in Econometrics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Johansen, S. and K. Juselius (1990). “Maximum Likelihood Estimation and 
Inference on Cointegration - With Applications to the Demand for Money”, Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 52, p. 169-210.
Jorgensen, C., H.C. Kongsted, and A. Rahbek (1997). Trend Stationarity in the 1(2) 
Cointegration Model. Discussion Paper 96-12, Institute of Economics, University of 
Copenhagen.
Jovanovic, M.N. (1991). European Economic Integration: Units and Prospects. 
London: Routledge.
Juselius, K. (1997). Do prices move together in the long-run? An 1(2) analysis of six 
price indices. Discussion Paper 97-21, Institute of Economics, University of 
Copenhagen.
Ljungqvist, L. and T.J. Sargent (1998). “The European Unemployment Dilemma”, 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106, no. 3, p. 514-550.
Mayes, D.G. (1990). “Factor Mobility” in Economics of the European Community 
(3’^‘* ed.) edited by A.M. El-Agraa, London: Phillip Allan.
McKinnon, R.I. (1963). “Optimum Currency Areas.” The American Economic 
Review, vol. 53, p. 717-725.
Mundell, R.A. (1961). “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas.” The American 
Economic Review, vol. 51, p. 657-665.
Overturf, S.F. (1997). Money and European Union. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Overturf, S.F. (1986). The Economic Principles of European Integration. New York: 
Praeger Publishers.
Özbay, P. (1997). Avrupa Para Birliği ve Euro. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez 
Bankası, Araştırma Genel Müdürlüğü, Tartışma Tebliği No: 9702.
Paruolo, P. (1996). “On the determination of cointegration indices in 1(2) systems.” 
Journal of Econometrics, vol. 72, 313-356.
72
Pitchford, R., A. Cox, M. Dolan, P. Smith, H. Engler, M. MacDonald, and M. John 
(1997). “Calculating the Odds on EMU.” In EMU Explained: Markets and Monetary 
Union edited by R. Pitchford and A. Cox, Reuters: London.
Selçuk, F. (1993). “Reel Döviz Kurları Üzerine.” İşletme ve Finans, Sayı 84, Mart 
1993.
Taylor, C. (1997). “The Economics and Politics of EMU.” In EMU Explained: 
Markets and Monetary Union, edited by R. Pitchford, and A. Cox. Reuters: London.
Zietz, J. (1996) “The Relative Price of Tradables and Nontradables and the U.S. 
Trade Balance.” Open Economies Review, Vol.7, No.2.
73
APPENDICES
A. THE DATA SET
1. Prices
The price indices of eleven EMU States, Turkey, Japan , and the United 
States are taken from International Financial Statistics (IPS) by IMF. The details of 
these data are given below:
Table A. 1.1 - The description of the price indices used in this study
Country Period Descriptor Time Series Key
Austria 1980:1-1997:12 C onsum er Prices 1 2 2 6 4 Z F
B elgium 1980:1-1997:12 C onsum er Prices 1 2 4 6 4 Z F
Finland 1980:1-1997:12 C onsum er Prices 17264 ZF
France 1980:1-1997:12 Consum er Prices 1 3 2 6 4 Z F
Germany 1980:1-1997:12 C onsum er Prices 1.3464 ZF
Ireland 1980:1-1997:12 Producer Prices 1 7 8 6 3 A Z F
Italy 1980:1-1997:12 Consum er Prices 1 3 6 6 4 Z F
Luxem bourg 1980:1-1997:12 Consum er Prices 13764 ZF
Netherlands 1980:1-1997:12 C onsum er Prices 1 3 8 6 4 Z F
Portugal 1980:1-1997:12 C onsum er Prices 1 8 2 6 4 Z F
Spain 1980:1-1997:12 C onsum er Prices 1 8 4 6 4 Z F
United States 1980:1-1997:12 C onsum er Prices 1 1 1 6 4 Z F
Turkey 1980:1-1997:12 C onsum er Prices 1 8 6 6 4 Z F
Japan 1980:1-1997:12 Consum er Prices 15864 ZF
2. Nominal Exchange Rates
The nominal exchange rates of eleven EMU States -  Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Spain -  against US dollar are taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
In addition, the nominal exchange rates of yen/$ and TL/$ used to calculate the real 
exchange rate indices of euro for Japanese yen and euro for Turkish lira are also 
taken from IFS. The details are given below in Table A.2.1.
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Table A.2.1 - The description o f the nominal exchange rate indices used in this study
Country Period Descriptor Time Series Key
Austria
B elgium
Finland
France
Germ any
Ireland
Italy
Luxem bourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
Japan_______ _
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1 -1997; 12 O fficial Rate (N .C ./$) 122 A F  ZF
1 -1997:12  Market Rate (N .C ./$) 124 A F  ZF
1 -1997:12 O fficial Rate (N .C ./$) 172 A F  ZF
1 -1997:12  O fficial Rate (N .C ./$) 132 A F ZF
1-1997:12 Market Rate (N .C ./$) 1 3 4 A F Z F
1 -1997; 12 Market Rate (N .C ./$) 178 A F  ZF
1-1997:12 Market Rate (N .C ./$) 1 3 6 A F Z F
1-1997:12 Market Rate (N .C ./$) 1 3 7 A F Z F
1-1997:12 Market Rate (N .C ./$ ) 1 3 8 A F Z F
1-1997:12 Market Rate (N .C ./$) 1 8 2 A F Z F
1 -1997:12 Market Rate (N .C ./$ ) 184 A F  ZF
1 -1997; 12 Market Rate (N .C ./$ ) 186 A F  ZF
I -1997:12 Market Rate (N .C ./$) I 5 8 A F Z F
B. REAL BILATERAL EXCHANGE RATES
The real bilateral exchange rates for the eleven EMU countries are calculated 
using equation (3.1). Base year for the price indices and nominal bilateral exchange 
rates used in these calculations is 1990. The variables are normalised to 1 for 1990. 
The real exchange rates are expected to fluctuate around “1” if the PPP hypothesis 
holds. The graphs of the real bilateral exchange rates are given in the following 
pages.
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Figure B.1 - The bilateral real exchange rates fo r Austria
e. AUS/IRE
g. AUS/LUX
i. AUS/POR
b. AUS/FIN
^  ^  
d. AUS/GER
f. AUS/ITA
76
77
78
79
Figure B .5- The bilateral real exchange rates for Germany 
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Figure B .6- The bilateral real exchange rates for Ireland
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Figure B.7 - The bilateral real exchange rates for Italy
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Figure B.10 -  The bilateral real exchange rates for Portugal
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Figure B.11 - The bilateral real exchange rates for Spain
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C. REAL EXCHANGE RATES: euro against US dollar, Japanese yen and 
Turkish lira
The real exchange rate indices for euro against US dollar, Japanese yen and 
Turkish lira are calculated using equation (3.1). Since the price index in euros is not 
available, a composite index of eleven participating countries is calculated using 
appropriate weights for each index.
The existing currency of European Union, ECU, is calculated using the trade 
volume of the participating countries. Danish krone British pound and Greek 
drachma is included in ECU while they do not participate in the third stage of EMU 
initially. In addition, Austrian schilling and Finnish markka are not included in the 
ECU. This rules out the possibility of using ECU weights in calculating the price 
index for euro.
Table C.l - The Composition of the ECU
Currency ¡979-1984 ¡984-1989 ¡989-1994 ¡995
German mark 33.0 32 .0 30.1 32.7
French franc 19.8 19.0 19.0 20.8
Pound sterling 13.3 15.0 13.0 11.2
Dutch guilder 10.5 10.1 9 .4 10.2
B elgian  franc 9.3 8.2 7 .6 8.4
Italian lira 9.5 10.2 10.15 7 .2
Spanish peseta - - 5.3 4 .2
D anish krone 3.1 1.1 2.45 2.1
Irish pound 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1
Portuguese escudo - - 0 .8 0 .7
Greek drachma - 1.3 0 .8 0.5
Luxem bourg franc 0 .4 0 .3 0 .3 0.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Table 2.1, page 58, European Economic 
Integration: Limits and Prospects, Miroslav N.
Jovanovic, ¡997, Routledge
Table C.l above gives the weights of the currencies of participating 
countries in the ECU. By using the trade volumes of the EMU States, the wights of 
the currencies in euro are calculated. These weights are given in Table C.2 below.
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Table C.2 - The Composition of the euro
Currency eiiroweights
Austrian schilling 3 .84
B elgian  franc 9 .59
Finnish markka 2.06
French franc 17.29
German mark 29.96
Irish pound 2.56
Italian lira 14.01
Luxem bourg franc 0 .53
Dutch guilder 11.53
Portuguese escudo 1.78
Spanish peseta 6 .86
88
